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INTRODUCTION 
Copyright deals with both property and speech in a unique 
way.  As a property regime, copyright gives authors a bundle of 
rights, regulating what they can and cannot do with their works.1  
These rights include the right to reproduce, distribute, perform, and 
display the copyrighted work, as well as the right to create 
derivative works.2  Like ordinary property owners, copyright 
owners enjoy exclusive rights over their works.  Others cannot 
reproduce or distribute the work without the owner’s permission.3  
Although copyright applies to intangible property, the rights of 
copyright owners are analogous to the rights of ordinary property 
owners.  After all, copyright is intellectual property—but property, 
nonetheless.4 
At the same time, copyright regulates speech.5  Most of the 
works that receive copyright protection also constitute speech 
within the meaning of the Constitution.  The First Amendment 
defines speech as any activity that conveys a particular and 
identifiable meaning and encompasses everything from political 
speeches to commercial slogans to burning the American flag as a 
 
 1 The Copyright Act provides that the author (or authors, in the case of joint 
ownership) is the initial owner of copyright in the work.  The author may transfer 
copyright ownership or any of his exclusive rights to another person or entity. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 201(a), (d) (2006).  In this Article, “author” refers to the initial owner of copyright, 
while “copyright owner” refers to the person or entity who owns the copyright, whether 
by transfer or initial authorship. 
 2 17 U.S.C § 106 (2007).  In addition, authors of visual works have rights to attribution 
and integrity. See id. § 106A. 
 3 The exclusivity of the copyright owner’s rights are subject to a number of 
exceptions, including fair use, reproduction by libraries and archives and certain kinds of 
secondary transmissions. See id. §§ 107–112, 117, 119, 121–22.  As well, § 115 provides 
a scheme for the compulsory licensing of non-dramatic musical works. 
 4 ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 13 
(7th ed. 2006) (“Copyright is generally regarded as a form of property, but it is property 
of a unique kind.”). 
 5 The U.S. Constitution recognizes the right to free “speech,” while the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognizes the right to the freedom of “expression.” See 
U.S. CONST. amend. I; Constitution Act, 1982, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
Part I of Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 1982, ch. 11, 
s. 2(b) (U.K.).  Putting aside the doctrinal differences between these two rights, this 
Article uses the terms “speech” and “expression” interchangeably. 
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sign of protest.6  Whether in the form of books, music, art, dance, 
or even computer programs, most if not all copyrightable subject 
matter falls under the constitutional definition of speech.7  
Moreover, the scope of protected speech and the scope of 
copyrightable subject matter have expanded considerably.  Courts 
tend to take a liberal approach in defining what activities constitute 
speech and frequently invalidate laws that restrict speech.8  At the 
same time, a wide range of works can obtain copyright.  Under the 
current statute, any work that is original and fixed in a tangible 
medium automatically receives copyright protection.9  With both 
doctrines’ expansive definitions of subject matter, the class of 
 
 6 For constitutional purposes, speech exists where “[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message was present, and the likelihood was great that the message would 
be understood by those who viewed it.” See Texas. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) 
(quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974)).  The First Amendment 
protects commercial speech. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is not wholly 
outside of the protection of the First Amendment and statutory bans on advertising 
prescription drug prices violated the First Amendment).  The First Amendment also 
protects flag-burning. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (holding that the act of burning an 
American flag is expressive conduct within the protection of the First Amendment). 
 7 Examples of copyrightable works that are not speech might include functional forms 
or charts. See Cont’l Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 263 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir. 1958) 
(granting copyright protection to an insurance form). But see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 
99, 104 (1879) (holding that a bookkeeping form was too intertwined with the underlying 
idea to receive copyright).  Architecture is given copyright protection under 17 U.S.C. § 
102(a)(8) but does not constitute speech.  Computer programs are both copyrighted 
works and speech under the First Amendment. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin 
Computer Corp., 714 F. 2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding a computer program is a 
literary work and therefore protected by the First Amendment, making it an appropriate 
subject of copyright); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
327 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also McGowan, infra note 42, at 292 (arguing that not all 
copyrighted works are speech). 
 8 See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2488 (2006) (striking down a Vermont 
statute limiting campaign expenditures); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 
234, 256 (2002) (striking down a federal statute regulating visual depictions of child 
pornography). 
 9 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2007) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”).  Originality refers to a work 
that is not copied from other works, and possesses a minimal amount of creativity. See 
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).  The Copyright Act has 
also greatly reduced the formalities of obtaining copyright. See GORMAN & GINSBURG, 
supra note 4, at 41. 
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copyrighted works that is also First Amendment protected speech 
is very broad indeed. 
Not surprisingly, the fact that copyright simultaneously deals 
with both property and speech creates significant legal problems.  
There is an inherent conflict between copyright, which gives 
exclusive rights over expressive works, and the First Amendment, 
which guarantees that the freedom of speech will not be 
abridged.10  Simply put, copyright law has the potential to violate 
the First Amendment.  Since copyright gives exclusive rights to 
authors to reproduce and disseminate their works, and these works 
are also speech, copyright effectively limits the ways in which 
others can exercise their right to free speech.  The most typical 
example of this conflict is found in the case of copyright 
infringement.  While the copyright owner alleges that the 
defendant copied a substantial part of his work without permission, 
the defendant counters that his actions were an act of free speech.  
The argument is that by penalizing such actions, copyright unduly 
infringes the defendant’s First Amendment rights and should be 
modified to meet constitutional standards.11  In another context, 
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of legislation that gave 
copyright owners a right to control access to their works.12  It was 
argued that this law substantially restricted the ability of others to 
access works for their own speech purposes.  In all these cases, the 
basic claim is that copyright restricts speech in a way that runs 
afoul of the First Amendment.13 
 
 10 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 11 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1985) 
(holding that a magazine’s unauthorized publication of verbatim quotes from the “heart” 
of unpublished presidential memoirs was not a fair use within the meaning of the 
Copyright Revision Act). 
 12 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 326 (challenging the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) (112 Stat. 2860 § 1201(a)(1), (2) (1998)), that amended title 
17 of the U.S. Code to prohibit the circumvention of technological measures that control 
access to copyrighted works and the trafficking of devices that do the same).  It was 
argued that the DMCA is unconstitutional because it prevents individuals from accessing 
protected works in order to make fair use of them. Id. 
 13 This Article focuses on the conflict between copyright and the First Amendment as it 
arises in cases of copyright infringement.  However, copyright law is also susceptible to 
challenges under the Copyright Clause in the Constitution.  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the 
plaintiffs argued that Congress’ extension of the copyright term was inconsistent with the 
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Over the past thirty years, scholars and courts have grappled 
with the conflict between copyright and free speech.  For the most 
part, the courts have concluded that copyright is compatible with 
the First Amendment.  Copyright’s speech-limiting effects are 
justified by the broader and ultimately speech-enhancing purpose 
of encouraging the creation of copyrighted works.14  In addition, 
the courts assert that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use 
doctrine keep copyright in line with the First Amendment.15  
However, most commentators disagree with the courts’ 
presumptive validity of copyright and argue that the existing law 
does not adequately respect speech interests.  Due to the 
elusiveness of the fair use defense, the ever-increasing duration of 
the copyright term, and the expanding breadth of authors’ rights, 
the majority of commentators argue that copyright unduly infringes 
the speech rights of others.16  As such, they suggest that copyright 
law is unconstitutional. 
The major flaw in this debate is that it ignores the fact that 
copyright deals with both property and speech.  On one hand, 
 
Constitution’s grant of rights to authors for “limited times.” 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003); 
see also Kahle v. Ashcroft, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1888 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2004) (where 
plaintiff argued that the elimination of the notice and renewal formalities in the copyright 
statute fundamentally altered the traditional contours of copyright and thereby infringed 
the First Amendment). 
 14 The Constitution provides that Congress has the power to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,  
cl. 8. 
 15 See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20 (stating copyright law inherently contains First 
Amendment accommodations because it only allows expressions, not ideas, to be subject 
to copyright protection). 
 16 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 
54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 12–26, 69–74 (2001) (criticizing the idea/expression dichotomy and 
fair use as inadequate accommodations of free speech, and describing the constitutional 
challenge to the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act that was the subject of 
litigation in Eldred); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms 
Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 541–45 (2004) (arguing that 
copyright law’s continual expansion means that it threatens more speech than ever 
before); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 
YALE L.J. 1, 11 (2002) (describing the speech-restricting effects of copyright’s ongoing 
enlargement); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 414–29 (1999) 
(discussing how anti-circumvention provisions in the DMCA endanger the freedom of 
speech). 
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commentators have attempted to portray copyright as a form of 
speech regulation.17  They emphasize the ways in which copyright 
substantially limits the speech abilities of others.  Accordingly, 
they argue that copyright ought to be evaluated in the same way 
that other speech laws are evaluated, such as campaign finance or 
obscenity laws.18  Others argue that the copyright jurisprudence 
devalues the speech interests of subsequent speakers and that 
copyright ought to serve the interests of a broader range of 
speakers.19  The common thread amongst these scholars is that 
they all conceive of copyright as something that restricts speech. 
On the other hand, the courts have rejected this characterization 
of copyright.  In most First Amendment cases, judges have 
summarily dismissed free speech arguments.  Courts either insist 
that copyright has already incorporated free speech concerns—
hence the famous, yet conclusory, remark that copyright is “the 
engine of free expression”20—or they downplay the defendant’s 
speech interests, claiming that his conduct simply does not engage 
the First Amendment.21  These cases demonstrate the courts’ 
unwillingness to equate copyright with other speech-regulating 
laws.  They seem to treat copyright as a different kind of regime—
a regime that creates entitlements that properly belong to the 
copyright owner and do not necessarily affect the speech interests 
of others.22 
 
 17 See, e.g., McGowan, infra note 42, at 291 (“Most free speech critiques of copyright 
take it for granted that copyright is a governmental restriction on speech.”). 
 18 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (holding that provisions limiting 
campaign contributions violated candidates’ rights to free speech); FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (holding that the FCC could disallow certain language 
from being used in public broadcasts without infringing on the broadcaster’s First 
Amendment rights). 
 19 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 16, at 565–67 (arguing that pure copyright can serve 
free speech values); Carys J. Craig, Putting the Community in Communication: 
Dissolving the Conflict Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright, 56 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 75, 76 (2006) (arguing that copyright should serve the speech interests of the broader 
community). 
 20 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 21 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 189 (2003) (“Protection of [copyright] 
does not raise the free speech concerns present when the government compels or burdens 
the communication of particular facts and ideas.  The First Amendment . . . bears less 
heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.”). 
 22 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 557. 
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This Article argues that the conflict between copyright and free 
speech should be re-examined by treating copyright as a form of 
property.  What the academics fail to consider, and what the courts 
naturally gravitate to, is the fact that copyright is primarily a 
property regime that deals with an owner’s rights in his intellectual 
property.  The reason why courts do not apply First Amendment 
analysis to copyright is not because of a desire to immunize 
copyright from the Constitution or an inability to grasp the 
defendants’ speech interests.  Rather, the courts regard copyright 
as a form of property that does not necessarily affect speech rights 
at all.  Indeed, the defendant’s conduct often seems more like a 
violation of the copyright owner’s property rights than a 
conflicting exercise of free speech.  If copyright is property, the 
defendant who copies another person’s work looks more like a 
thief than a speaker. 
Of course, this is not to say that copyright does not affect 
speech.  Since so many copyrighted works are also constitutionally 
recognized speech, the rules and restrictions imposed by copyright 
law inevitably impact the right to free speech.  However, treating 
copyright as property does not mean it is exempt from speech 
concerns.  In fact, a property-based analysis can shed more light on 
how copyright conflicts with the First Amendment and how this 
conflict can be resolved.  The main problem with the courts’ 
approach is that it has failed to acknowledge that property can 
infringe upon speech interests in its own right.  Through the well-
established public forum doctrine, the courts have scrutinized 
property rights and whether they unjustifiably encroach upon 
individuals’ speech rights.  The fact that copyright is property, 
then, does not immunize it from the First Amendment.  Instead, it 
establishes a clear basis upon which copyright can be 
constitutionally analyzed.  Since copyright creates a quasi-public 
forum, it ought to accommodate the speech interests of the public 
to the satisfaction of the Constitution. 
This Article begins with an overview of the existing cases and 
commentary that deal with the conflict between copyright law and 
the First Amendment.  While academics portray copyright as 
regulation that significantly restricts speech, the courts view 
copyright as a form of property that does not necessarily affect 
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speech at all.  In this regard, a comparison with Canadian 
jurisprudence is useful because Canadian courts have expressly 
treated copyright as property.  In Part III, it is argued that copyright 
is a property regime that only incidentally affects speech. In light 
of its public purposes, however, copyright should be understood as 
a form of quasi-public property that is meant to facilitate the 
speech of others.  Finally, Part IV of this Article explains that 
copyright’s property status does not exempt it from the First 
Amendment.  Specifically, copyright can be compared to a public 
forum which ought to be made available for speech purposes that 
are compatible with the property, and which do not unduly infringe 
the private interests of the owner.  In this way, viewing copyright 
as property does not foreclose free speech concerns, but instead 
provides a clear and novel framework with which to understand the 
conflict between copyright and free speech. 
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: THE 
EXISTING FRAMEWORK 
A. The Commentators Treat Copyright as Speech Regulation 
There is extensive literature examining the conflict between 
copyright and the First Amendment.  For the most part, this 
literature focuses on the way that copyright inherently burdens free 
speech.  In 1970, Melville Nimmer wrote a seminal article 
describing the way in which copyright and speech potentially 
contradict each other.23  Since copyright prohibits the unauthorized 
use of copyrighted expression, it necessarily abridges the freedom 
of expression.24  However, Nimmer concluded that existing 
copyright law adequately accommodated speech interests.  
Through the idea/expression dichotomy, which reserves expression 
but leaves ideas free for the taking, and the fair use defense, which 
justifies copyright infringement for certain public policy reasons, 
copyright has already determined the appropriate balance between 
 
 23 Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of 
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1180 (1970). 
 24 Id. at 1181. 
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copyright and speech.25  Although Nimmer identified specific 
instances in which copyright law may need to be modified to 
accommodate the First Amendment, he argued that copyright law 
itself supplied sufficient safeguards for speech interests.26  As 
such, he implicitly accepted that copyright is a form of speech 
regulation, though he believed it already contained its own ways to 
deal with these problems.27 
Subsequent scholarship has reached less optimistic 
conclusions.  Some scholars argue that copyright should be 
analyzed under the First Amendment like other kinds of speech 
regulation.  For example, Lemley and Volokh argue that copyright 
is a form of content-based speech regulation because its restriction 
depends on the content of the defendant’s speech.28  Since 
infringement depends on how substantially similar the defendant’s 
work is to the copyrighted work, copyright’s prohibitive effects are 
based on the content of the defendant’s work.29  Although other 
scholars have criticized this analysis, it represents an effort to 
 
 25 Id. at 1189–91, 1200 (arguing that copyright was the product of “definitional 
balancing” between the freedom of speech and the need to encourage authors to create 
works).  Other scholars have argued that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use are 
too vague or uncertain to adequately protect speech interests. See Netanel, supra note 16, 
at 12–26; Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 13–16, 18–21.  In doing so, they implicitly accept 
Nimmer’s basic proposition that copyright can accommodate free speech, only they 
believe that these doctrines need to be modified to meet constitutional standards.  The 
defense of fair use provides that copyright infringement is not a violation if the purpose 
of the use was for criticism, comment, news reporting, and other similar purposes. See 17 
U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 26 Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1197–99.  For example, Nimmer argues that home movie 
films of the John F. Kennedy assassination and photographs of the My Lai massacre are 
works where the ideas and expression are so “wedded together” that one cannot conjure 
up the idea without also using the expression. Id.  In this case, Nimmer suggests that the 
substantial speech values at stake would be served by having compulsory licenses. Id. 
 27 See id. at 1192 (acknowledging that prohibiting the reproduction of copyrighted 
works infringes the freedom of speech, but “this is justified by the greater public good in 
the copyright encouragement of creative works”). 
 28 See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 186 (1998).  A similar argument is 
advanced by Jed Rubenfeld. See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 5. 
 29 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 28, at 186; see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 
472–73 (2d Cir. 1946) (infringement is determined by looking at the substantial similarity 
of the allegedly infringing work to the original); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (where Justice Learned Hand conducted a detailed, substantive 
evaluation of the allegedly infringing work to determine whether there was infringement). 
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portray copyright as regulation that significantly intrudes on 
speech interests and should be analyzed as such.30 
Others contend that copyright is content-neutral speech 
regulation that ought to be evaluated according to the First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Netanel argues that copyright law is 
content-neutral because although infringement is based on the 
content of the defendant’s speech, it is neutral in regards to 
viewpoint.31  Just as copyright protection can apply to a wide range 
of works, irrespective of their content or artistic merit,32 
copyright’s corresponding limitation on subsequent speakers 
applies irrespective of their message or viewpoint.33  Netanel 
argues that copyright is better viewed as content-neutral speech 
regulation that should be subject to more “rigorous” scrutiny.34  
Relying on the example of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
FCC,35 Netanal compares copyright to a governmental system that 
 
 30 See Netanel, supra note 16, at 48–49 (arguing that, with respect to copyright law, 
“content sensitive” does not mean “content-based” within the meaning of the First 
Amendment); McGowan, infra note 42, at 294–96 (arguing that courts make distinctions 
based on content to identify situations where First Amendment values trump competing 
values).  If copyright is content-based speech regulation, it is subject to higher levels of 
scrutiny than content-neutral regulation. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 31 Netanel, supra note 16, at 49.  The Supreme Court distinguishes between laws that 
are content-based and those that discriminate on viewpoint, but it has stated that content-
based laws are “presumptively invalid.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382.  However, viewpoint 
discrimination is also seen as being particularly objectionable. See id. at 391.  For present 
purposes, this article assumes that Netanel considers copyright as content-neutral 
regulation that deserves less scrutiny than content-based regulation; which may or may 
not discriminate according to one’s viewpoint.  Although Rubenfeld argues that copyright 
is content-based, he notes that where a finding of infringement does not require an 
understanding of the words used, the prohibition is content-neutral. See Rubenfeld, supra 
note 16, at 48–49. 
 32 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (holding that 
since “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,” the artistic merit 
of a work did not determine whether it obtained copyright protection). 
 33 Netanel, supra note 16, at 49; see also Lillian R. BeVier, Copyright, Trespass, and 
the First Amendment: An Institutional Perspective, 21 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 104, 130 
(2004) (arguing that enforcing copyright does not involve governmental discrimination 
based on viewpoint). 
 34 Netanel, supra note 16, at 55. 
 35 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
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allocates speech entitlements amongst various speakers.36  Courts 
determine the constitutionality of these systems by examining the 
nature of the government’s purpose, whether there is satisfactory 
factual support for the purpose, and the propriety of the 
government’s means.37  Netanel argues that copyright should be 
subject to the same kind of rigorous scrutiny that was applied in 
Turner.38  His argument explicitly treats copyright as speech 
regulation that should be analyzed using the same First 
Amendment standards that apply to similar forms of regulation. 
Still others argue that the speech interests of those who borrow 
from copyrighted works should be taken more seriously.  While 
transformative borrowing ought to receive fair use protection, non-
transformative or even verbatim copying can serve valid speech 
interests.  For instance, Tushnet argues that given the nature of 
what is copied, the speaker’s intent, and the surrounding context, 
even wholesale copying of a copyrighted work can engage First 
Amendment values.39  Tushnet uses the example of a speaker 
repeating Dr. Martin Luther King’s iconic “I Have a Dream” 
 
 36 Netanel, supra note 16 at 55–56; Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 662 (holding that 
provisions requiring cable television system operators to broadcast local stations is 
subject to intermediate scrutiny, which is applicable to content-neutral restrictions on 
speech).  Moreover, Netanel argues that copyright “brazenly and consistently” allocates 
speech entitlements to benefit copyright owners while burdening the public at large. 
Netanel, supra note 16, at 69. 
 37 Netanel, supra note 16, at 58 (discussing that in determining the constitutionality of 
these systems, courts consider whether there are less speech-restrictive means of 
furthering the governmental interest). 
 38 Id. at 58–59 (describing the court’s approach in Turner as an application of the 
intermediate scrutiny standard with “unaccustomed vigor”).  Intermediate scrutiny is 
usually applied to “time, place or manner” regulations, which are justified if they meet an 
important state interest and are narrowly tailored so as to not burden more speech than is 
necessary. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (finding that a 
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it furthers an important government 
interest and is tailored so it restricts First Amendment freedoms no more than necessary); 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (reaffirming that a “time, place, 
or manner” regulation must be narrowly tailored to a legitimate, content-neutral, 
government interest).  On the other hand, rigorous scrutiny involves more searching 
inquiry about the government’s interest, the factual support for that interest, and whether 
there is a precise “fit” between the means and ends. Netanel, supra note 16, at 58.  
Although Netanel’s article is somewhat unclear about whether the standard of review he 
argues for is “rigorous scrutiny,” “heightened scrutiny,” or “intermediate scrutiny,” this 
Article assumes he uses these terms interchangeably. 
 39 Tushnet, supra note 16, at 546. 
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speech at a civil rights rally to point out that verbatim copying can 
serve important political and democratic values and further the 
speaker’s self-fulfillment and autonomy.40  The speaker has good 
reasons for copying King—it references the significance of King’s 
original speech, it lends authenticity to the speaker’s current 
speech, and it evokes the historical and political significance that 
the speech has in the public psyche.41  In this way, copying 
copyrighted works can serve interests that are traditionally valued 
under the First Amendment.  To the extent that copyright prohibits 
such speech, it is a form of speech regulation that unduly 
diminishes the scope of free speech. 
Even scholars who disagree about the First Amendment’s 
application to copyright accept the basic premise that copyright 
regulates speech.  Specifically, David McGowan describes the 
tension between copyright and free speech as involving the 
conflicting speech interests of two speakers.42  Copyright 
infringement is the clash between the speech interests of the 
plaintiff-copyright owner and the defendant.43  However, 
McGowan argues that the First Amendment is not equipped to 
resolve such speaker-speaker disputes.  He asserts that the First 
Amendment usually deals with the conflict between an individual’s 
speech and a non-speech-related governmental interest, such as 
national security or public order.44  In these cases, the courts 
 
 40 Id. at 574–78.  Tushnet notes that King’s “original speech” delivered in front of the 
Lincoln Memorial was not in fact original, since he had delivered similar speeches on 
many prior occasions. Id. at 575.  Tushnet points out that given the context of the 250,000 
marchers gathered in Washington, D.C., the speech took on new significance. Id. at 575–
76. With regard to the speech values at stake, there are three oft-cited rationales for free 
speech: the discovery of truth, political participation, and self-fulfillment. See Thomas I. 
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878–79 
(1963). 
 41 See Tushnet, supra note 16, at 568–81 (describing copying as a means of self-
expression, persuasion, and affirmation). 
 42 David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 281, 285, 301 (2004). 
 43 See id. at 285 (describing how copyright pits the interests of an “upstream” author 
against a “downstream” author, thereby implying that both parties have the same speech 
rights at stake). 
 44 Id. at 296.  For example, speech regulations created for the purpose of national 
security or public order include the laws at issue in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
447 (1969) (holding that states may proscribe First Amendment rights only when free 
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determine whether the law’s restrictions on speech are justified by 
the proffered governmental purpose.  However, since copyright 
pits one person’s speech interest against another’s, and both people 
have presumptively equal claims to free speech, the First 
Amendment does not have the tools to adjudicate the dispute.45  
McGowan’s argument is problematic in many ways.  It can be 
argued, for instance, that there are First Amendment cases dealing 
with speaker-speaker conflict,46 or that existing First Amendment 
doctrine should apply despite the lack of precedent. Nonetheless, 
he concedes that copyright regulates speech. Thus, while 
McGowan acknowledges that copyright affects the speech interests 
of copyright owners and subsequent speakers, he does not think the 
First Amendment can resolve this problem.47 
There are good reasons why scholars tend to characterize 
copyright as a form of speech regulation.  Over the past several 
decades, the courts have continually expanded the scope and 
meaning of the right to free speech.  A wide array of activities, 
such as commercial speech, campaign spending, nonverbal 
conduct and silence all constitute protected speech.48  The courts 
have also narrowed the categories of speech that fall outside the 
 
speech or free press is directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action and is likely 
to produce such action, thereby endangering the public security). See also N.Y. Times v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding that any restraints on expression carry a 
presumption of unconstitutionality). 
 45 McGowan, supra note 42, at 284–85, 300–01 (arguing that the First Amendment 
does not provide a basis with which to distinguish between the rights of “upstream” 
versus “downstream” users). 
 46 See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557, 572–73 (1995) (holding that a state could not require individuals to alter the content 
of their First Amendment expressions, even though the expressions, as they were, 
violated a state public accommodation law); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 
659 (2000) (holding that requiring the Boy Scouts to allow a homosexual to be a 
scoutmaster violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association). 
 47 McGowan, supra note 42, at 299 (acknowledging that there are problems with 
treating copyright as speech restriction, and conceding that it affects “significant amounts 
of expression”). 
 48 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding 
that local authorities cannot compel salutation of the United States flag); see also Wooley 
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (holding the right to speak and the right to refrain 
from speaking are protected by the First Amendment). 
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First Amendment.49  At the same time, courts often strike down 
laws that restrict speech in many different contexts.50  Given the 
liberal definition of free speech in American law, it is not 
surprising that scholars tend to emphasize the speech interests at 
stake in order to criticize copyright law.  The more that copyright 
looks like intrusive speech regulation, the more likely it is that 
courts will favour defendants and re-shape copyright law to 
accommodate their speech interests. 
 
B. The Courts Treat Copyright as Property 
The argument that copyright is a form of speech regulation has 
been largely unsuccessful in the courts.  Although the courts 
concede that copyright is not “categorically immune” from 
constitutional scrutiny, they have concluded that existing copyright 
law meets First Amendment standards.51  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the 
Supreme Court dealt summarily with the constitutional challenge 
by declaring that “copyright contains built-in First Amendment 
accommodations.”52  Borrowing directly from Nimmer, the Court 
identified the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use as the 
accommodations that kept copyright compatible with free speech.53  
Without analyzing the specific ways in which copyright burdens 
speech and how it mitigates those burdens, the Court assumed that 
copyright is consistent with the First Amendment.  This cursory 
 
 49 For example, the unprotected class of “fighting words” is limited to speech that 
directly incites anger in others, and not generalized epithets or insults. See Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (holding that Cohen’s jacket, which displayed an 
offensive slogan, did not constitute fighting words because “[n]o individual . . . could 
reasonably have regarded the words on appellant’s jacket as a direct personal insult”). 
 50 See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997) (finding 
that where a statute is plagued by vagueness, and promulgated to regulate content-based 
speech, significant First Amendment concerns arise). 
 51 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s 
holding in Eldred v. Reno that copyright was “categorically immune from challenges 
under the First Amendment” (citing Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
 52 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.  The petitioners argued that the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act was a content-neutral regulation that failed heightened judicial 
review under the First Amendment, but the Court rejected this as “uncommonly strict 
scrutiny” for copyright. Id. at 218–19. 
 53 Id. at 219–20. 
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treatment of copyright is striking in light of the substantial 
attention that courts usually give to other speech regulations.54  At 
a minimum, these laws are scrutinized in terms of whether there is 
a compelling state interest and whether the means chosen is 
tailored to suit the ends.55  It may be that the Court simply believes 
that copyright satisfies this test, as is suggested by the statement 
that as long as copyright stays within its “traditional contours,” 
First Amendment scrutiny is not necessary.56  But the complete 
lack of analysis suggests that the court treats copyright as a 
different kind of regime that does not need to be subjected to 
normal First Amendment analysis. 
Moreover, the Eldred Court questioned whether there is a 
conflict between copyright and free speech in the first place.57  
Justice Ginsburg opined that since the Copyright Clause and the 
First Amendment were adopted at around the same time, the 
Framers intended for copyright to be compatible with free 
speech.58  The Court argued that copyright does not conflict with 
the First Amendment since it gives authors an economic incentive 
to create and distribute their works.59  Thus, copyright actually 
enhances individuals’ speech abilities.  Given that copyright’s 
purpose is to facilitate the creation and dissemination of 
expression, it cannot properly be conceived of as a speech-
restricting regulation.  Although copyright may affect some 
speech, its overall effect is to further the goals of free speech and, 
therefore, it does not merit First Amendment scrutiny. 
Yet there is another important reason why the courts are so 
resistant to applying First Amendment analysis to copyright.  In 
 
 54 For example, even relatively mundane regulations have been scrutinized under the 
First Amendment. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559–60 (1948) (invalidating a 
city ordinance prohibiting trucks with sound amplification devices). 
 55 This refers to the intermediate scrutiny standard, which applies to a wide variety of 
speech regulations. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 56 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 57 Id. at 194. 
 58 Id. at 219.  However, it can be argued that the co-existence of the Copyright Clause 
and the First Amendment does not immunize the former from the latter. Congress’ 
powers are limited by the Bill of Rights, which includes the First Amendment. See 
Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1181–82; Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 12–13. 
 59 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539 (1985)). 
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Eldred, Justice Ginsburg explained that the First Amendment 
“protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own 
speech.”60  However, Ginsburg further stated that the First 
Amendment “bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to 
make other people’s speeches.”61  The choice of words is 
revealing: the First Amendment applies with less force when a 
person makes someone else’s speech.  The suggestion is that the 
First Amendment does not grant a person the right to use another 
person’s speech as his own.  By emphasizing the fact that the 
speech belongs to someone else, the Eldred Court seems to view 
copyright not as a form of speech regulation, but as a form of 
property.62  The reason the First Amendment does not apply to 
copyright is because there is a property interest in play instead of a 
speech interest.  In the Court’s view, the speaker who uses the 
copyrighted work is not so much borrowing the work as he is 
stealing it—stealing the creative expression of the original work in 
which the owner has a proprietary interest.  For this reason, the 
Court drew a distinction between a speaker who makes his “own” 
speech and a speaker who makes “other people’s speeches.”63  The 
person who makes other people’s speeches is not exercising his 
right to speech, but is simply misappropriating property that 
belongs to another. 
The Eldred Court’s reference to making one’s own speeches 
does not mean that a speaker must say something novel or original 
to merit First Amendment protection.64  A requirement of novelty 
or originality would be wholly foreign to the First Amendment.65 
The right to free speech does not depend on whether the speaker 
says something new or creative.66  A person who waves a placard 
 
 60 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1181 (noting that the First Amendment does not only 
protect speech that is original to the speaker); see also Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 391 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2001) (holding that reproductions are 
entitled to First Amendment protection). 
 66 See Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1181 (noting the basic principle that underlies 
opposition to governmental censorship: the First Amendment does not only protect 
speech that is original to the speaker but protects speech for all men whether or not they 
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is exercising his right to free speech notwithstanding the fact that 
someone else wrote the slogan, or the slogan was an unoriginal, 
generic phrase like “War is Terrorism.”  It would be inimical to the 
values of free speech to require speakers to say something unique 
in order to gain the protection of the First Amendment.67  
Evidently, the notion of originality is derived from copyright.  
Copyright only applies to original works—works that are not 
copied from another source and that possess a minimal amount of 
creativity.68  This threshold is low, but it nevertheless bars works 
which are almost identical to existing works.69  When Eldred and 
other cases suggest that free speech does not encompass the right 
to make other people’s speeches,70 this cannot be understood to 
introduce an originality requirement into the First Amendment.71  
The problem with an individual taking another person’s speech is 
not that speech must be original to that individual, but that the 
speech actually belongs to someone else.  In other words, the 
court’s language of “other people’s speeches” must refer to the 
 
qualify as artistic creators); see also Comedy III Prods., 25 Cal. 4th 387 at 391 (holding 
that reproductions are entitled to First Amendment protection). 
 67 Given the values of autonomy, self-fulfillment, and truth-seeking that underlie the 
right to free speech, it would seem that a person’s intention to engage in expressive 
conduct suffices for First Amendment protection. See Emerson, supra note 40, at 878–79. 
 68 Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citations 
omitted). 
 69 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884) (holding that 
the photographer’s role in posing the subject, and selecting and arranging the costume 
and draperies constituted sufficient originality for copyright purposes); Alfred Bell & Co. 
v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 104–05 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding that mezzo-tint 
reproductions of existing works could obtain copyright). 
 70 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
 71 The Canadian jurisprudence has also referred to the need for originality.  In Michelin, 
the court reviewed the cases of Canadian Tire Corp. v. Retail Clerks Union, [1985] 7 
C.P.R. (3d) 415 (F.C.T.D.) (Can.) and R. v. Lorimer [1984], 77 C.P.R. (2d) 262 (F.C.A.). 
Cie générale des établissements Michelin v. CAW [1996] 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348, (F.C.T.D.) 
(Can.).  These cases considered the relationship between the Charter and copyright.  The 
Michelin court concluded, “it appears that [these cases] found that the infringers’ use of 
the copyrighted material demonstrated insufficient original thought to be labeled 
protected expression under Section 2(b).” Id. ¶ 84.  The court went on to reject the need 
for originality and held that because the definition for expression under § 2(b) was not 
equivalent to the definition of “original works” under the Copyright Act, the defendant’s 
works were examples of expression, even though they were not original works for the 
purposes of the Copyright Act. Id. ¶ 91. 
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proprietary aspect of speech in order to be consistent with the First 
Amendment.72 
The notion that copyright is property regulation instead of 
speech regulation animates other cases as well.73  For example, in 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the 
defendants argued that their copying of a Gerald Ford memoir was 
justified because of the public’s First Amendment interests in the 
work’s contents.74  The Court rejected this argument because, 
although the work was one of high public interest, the copyright 
owner possessed the exclusive right of first publication.75  The 
Court stated that “[t]he author’s control of first public distribution 
implicates not only his personal interest in creative control but his 
property interest in exploitation of prepublication rights . . . .”76  
The Court indicated that copyright gives authors a property right in 
the form of a right to benefit from the initial publication of the 
work.77  The court went on to say that as a property right, the right 
to first publication is likely to outweigh any claim of fair use.78  In 
this way, the court treated the copyright owner’s interest as a 
property right that would not be easily displaced by speech 
interests.  Indeed, Harper & Row featured both the intangible and 
tangible appropriation of property.  The fact that the defendants 
had actually obtained a stolen copy of the manuscript lent further 
support to the notion that the issue was about property, not 
speech.79  As in Eldred, the court rejected the First Amendment 
 
 72 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 73 See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 24 (describing earlier cases in which the courts have 
suggested that copyright is a property right). 
 74 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985). 
 75 See id. at 553, 555–56. 
 76 Id. at 555 (emphasis added). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. (“Under ordinary circumstances, the author’s right to control the first public 
appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use”).  The 
Harper & Row Court’s emphasis on the right to first publication was so substantial that 
Congress subsequently amended the Copyright Act to make it clear that unpublished 
works did not necessarily rule against a finding of fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) 
(“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such 
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.”). 
 79 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985) 
(describing the clandestine circumstances under which the defendants obtained a copy of 
the manuscript). 
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challenge because it viewed copyright as a property right, so that 
the defendant’s conduct was more like a misappropriation of the 
copyright owner’s property than an exercise of free speech. 
Interpreting the court’s approach to copyright and free speech 
through the lens of property gives a better explanation of their 
jurisprudence to date.  The courts have declined to apply normal 
First Amendment doctrine in copyright cases.80  This is not 
because they fail to appreciate the conflict between copyright and 
speech or the significance of the defendant’s speech interests.  Nor 
are they trying to exempt copyright from the requirements of the 
First Amendment.81  Neither of these explanations is compelling 
given the court’s able application of First Amendment doctrine in 
other contexts.  Instead, courts see copyright as a set of property 
rights that belong to authors and copyright owners.  As such, 
speech interests are not necessarily implicated in every case where 
another person makes speech using copyrighted material.  Instead, 
many of these cases are better understood as situations where the 
subsequent speaker misappropriated property that belongs to 
another person. 
C. Copyright as Property: The Canadian Example 
A comparison with the Canadian copyright jurisprudence is 
instructive.  Although Canadian case law regarding copyright and 
free speech is relatively under-developed, there are cases that have 
directly acknowledged the link between copyright and property.  
By way of background, subsection 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) guarantees the freedom of 
expression.82  Although Canadian courts have adopted a 
comparably broad definition of expression, the freedom of 
expression under the Charter is arguably more limited than the 
 
 80 See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 81 See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 7 (describing copyright’s magical immunity from 
First Amendment scrutiny). 
 82 Subsection 2(b) provides, “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: . . . 
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press 
and other media of communication.” Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). 
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freedom of speech under the First Amendment.83  This may be due 
to the fact that the Charter contains a limitations clause in § 1, 
which provides that constitutional rights are subject to the 
reasonable limits that are found in a free and democratic society.84  
Together with a different social and political climate, the right to 
free expression has received less liberal interpretations than free 
speech in the U.S.85  In terms of copyright, the U.S. and Canada 
have similar copyright statutes, granting a similar set of exclusive 
rights and protecting a comparable breadth of works.86  One 
notable difference is that fair use is called “fair dealing” under the 
Canadian statute and is limited to the enumerated purposes of 
research, criticism, commentary, review, and news reporting.87  
 
 83 See Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Que., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, ¶ 56 (Can.) (defining expression as 
including activity which conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, but excluding 
violence); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.) (upholding a law which 
criminalized hate speech under the Charter). But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul., 505 U.S. 
377 (1992) (striking down a statute prohibiting the placement of symbols known to 
arouse anger or alarm based on race, creed or gender). 
 84 Section 1 provides, “[the Charter] guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society.” Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).  The 
limitations clause may restrain the interpretation of the freedom of expression because it 
explicitly recognizes that Charter rights are not absolute, and provides guidelines for the 
court to determine the limits of such rights. See Comm. for the Commonwealth v. Can., 
[1991] 1 S.C.R. 139, ¶ 7 (Can.) (describing section 1 of the Charter as one of the 
“fundamental differences between the American Constitution and the Charter”) (per 
Lamer J.). 
 85 See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 7.  In general, the Canadian courts have expressed 
caution about applying American constitutional law to the Charter. See Keegstra, 3 
S.C.R., ¶¶ 52–61. 
 86 Canada Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 3(1) (1985) (listing the exclusive rights to 
produce, reproduce, perform, publish, and broadcast the work).  Although the Canadian 
statute does not explicitly grant a right to create derivative works, it grants the rights to 
translate and adapt the work, as well as the right to convert a dramatic work into a non-
dramatic work, or vice versa.  In addition, the Canadian statute grants moral rights to all 
copyrighted works. Id. § 14. 
 87 For the purposes of criticism, review, or news reporting, the original work and its 
author(s) must be identified.  There is no need for identification if the work is used for 
research or private study. Id. § 29–29.2.  The term “fair dealing” is derived from English 
copyright law. See The UK Copyright Service, UK Copyright Law Fact Sheet, Aug. 11, 
2004, http://www.copyrightservice.co.uk/copyright/p01_uk_copyright_law.  The 
Canadian courts have distinguished fair dealing from fair use. Cie Générale des 
Établissements Michelin v. C.A.W., [1996] 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348, ¶ 71 (F.C.T.D.) (Can.). 
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Unlike U.S. courts, Canadian courts have held that fair dealing 
does not include additional kinds of purposes and that parody is 
not a form of criticism that can be shielded by fair dealing.88 
The key Canadian case dealing with the conflict between 
copyright and the freedom of expression is Cie Générale des 
Établissements Michelin v. C.A.W.89 CGEM Michelin, the 
international tire-making company, brought a claim of copyright 
infringement against a labor union.90  In order to unionize 
employees at Michelin factories in Nova Scotia, the union 
distributed leaflets and posters depicting the well-known Michelin 
corporate logo, the Michelin Tire Man or “Bibendum.”91  In the 
leaflets, the union portrayed the Michelin Tire Man not as the 
smiling marshmallow figure he normally is, but as a menacing 
giant about to crush tiny employees positioned under his foot.92  
Not surprisingly, the union did not obtain Michelin’s permission to 
reproduce the logo.93  The defendants argued that their use of the 
Michelin Tire Man was a parody sheltered by fair dealing, or 
alternatively, that their constitutional right to freedom of 
expression protected their conduct.94 
In Michelin, the Canadian court rejected the union’s 
constitutional challenge and explicitly recognized copyright as a 
property right.95  Despite the arguably important values served by 
the union’s activity, the court found that its freedom of expression 
had not been restricted.96  In the court’s words, “[t]he Charter does 
 
 88 See CCH Can. Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, ¶ 54 (Can.) 
(holding that although the fair dealing purposes ought to be interpreted liberally, they 
were limited to those enumerated in the statute); Michelin, 71 C.P.R. (3d), ¶ 71 (holding 
that parody is not a form of criticism under the Canadian Copyright Act). 
 89 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348 (holding that parody is not a form of criticism under the Canadian 
Copyright Act). 
 90 Id. ¶ 3. 
 91 Id. ¶ 8. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. ¶ 3. 
 94 Id. ¶ 71 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that parody is a form of “criticism” 
under fair dealing). 
 95 Id. ¶ 93. 
 96 It could be argued that the union’s purpose of recruiting employees to its 
organization served an important political function. See James Pope, The Three-Systems 
Ladder of First Amendment Values: Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 
189 (1984). 
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not confer the right to use private property—the Plaintiff’s 
copyright—in the service of freedom of expression.”97  With this 
statement, the court clearly circumscribes the freedom of 
expression at the point where it conflicts with the copyright 
owner’s property right.  No matter what the definition of the 
freedom of expression may be, it does not grant speakers the right 
to use a copyrighted work to make speech.98  In the court’s view, 
the union may have been expressing itself, but such expression was 
not protected where it involved misappropriating someone else’s 
property.  As such, the union was not exercising its freedom of 
expression but was akin to a trespasser who uses private property 
to express himself or herself.99  This decision reflects the way in 
which courts treat copyright as property, as well as their tendency 
to elevate property rights over speech in copyright cases.100 
In summary, both the U.S. and Canadian jurisprudence 
demonstrate the courts’ unwillingness to treat copyright as a form 
of speech regulation.  The courts do not apply normal First 
Amendment analysis to copyright because they view copyright as a 
property right that does not necessarily affect the speech interests 
of others.  Although they do not say as much, the Eldred Court’s 
opinion that free speech does not include the right to use another 
person’s speech101 suggests that they understand copyright 
infringement as an act of appropriation rather than expression.  
However, the courts are mistaken to conclude that copyright’s 
property status removes it from the scrutiny of the First 
Amendment.  It is as property that copyright must be analyzed for 
whether it unjustifiably infringes on the free speech of others. 
 
 97 Michelin, 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348, ¶ 85. 
 98 Id. ¶ 93. 
 99 The court noted that the defendants were not claiming the right to distribute anti-
Michelin leaflets on the company’s premises, for that would clearly constitute an illegal 
trespass.  Rather, the defendants argued that they had a right to actually use the 
company’s property to express themselves.  In this way, the court suggests that the use of 
copyrighted property is akin to, or perhaps even more invasive than, trespass. See id.¶ 96. 
 100 See Craig, supra note 19, at 85. 
 101 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
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II. COPYRIGHT IS QUASI-PUBLIC PROPERTY 
Aside from the courts’ interpretations, is copyright better 
characterized as property or speech regulation?  Given the nature 
of the copyright scheme, it is arguable that copyright gives 
property rights to authors and owners to allow them to control and 
exploit their works.  The main purpose of copyright is not to 
regulate speech, but to establish a set of property rights that give 
authors the economic incentive to create works.  In this way, 
copyright is a form of property that only incidentally affects the 
speech interests of others.  However, characterizing copyright as 
property does not mean it is immune from First Amendment 
concerns.  Since copyright has public dimensions, it is a form of 
quasi-public property that must accommodate the speech interests 
of others. 
A. Copyright is a Property Right 
From the perspective of authors and owners, copyright has 
more to do with property rights than speech rights.  The exclusive 
rights enjoyed by the copyright owner form the crux of copyright 
law.102  The statute provides that an owner can transfer these rights 
to another person or entity, but only if the transfer is signed and in 
writing.103  The fact that copyright entitlements must be transferred 
in a voluntary transaction between the parties illustrates the 
proprietary nature of copyright.104  Like other property rights, the 
state decides whom the entitlement belongs to, but it does not 
determine the value of the right nor compel the owner to 
 
 102 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A (2006).  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act gives 
additional rights to control access to and prevent the circumvention of technologically 
protected works. Id. § 1201(a)–(b). 
 103 Id. § 204.  Notably the statute specifically provides that where there is no voluntary 
transfer, state action purporting to seize or expropriate the rights is invalid. See id. § 
201(e); see also Effects Assoc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming 
that a transfer of copyright must be in writing). 
 104 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) 
(describing a property rule as one where “someone who wishes to remove the entitlement 
from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the 
entitlement is agreed upon by the seller”). 
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participate in the transaction.105  Thus, copyright creates property 
rights rather than liability rules, which govern both the assignment 
of the entitlement and its value.106  In addition, the exclusivity of 
copyright suggests that it is a form of property.107  The most 
powerful aspect of copyright is not that owners can sell, reproduce 
or perform their works, but that they possess an exclusive right to 
do so.  Certainly, owners are able to sell and disseminate their 
works in the absence of copyright, and copyright does not directly 
assist them in these activities.  Copyright limits the number of 
people who can carry out these activities and gives them the ability 
to prevent others from doing the same.  In this way, a copyright 
owner is similar to an owner of tangible property—both possess an 
exclusive entitlement to their property.  As owners, they enjoy 
exclusive possession of their property and have the right to exclude 
others.108 
Furthermore, the rights granted by copyright are the intellectual 
property equivalents of the rights belonging to owners of real 
property.109  Like landowners, copyright owners possess rights that 
allow them to use and enjoy their property.110  For example, the 
copyright owner’s rights to reproduce and distribute his work are 
analogous to the real property owner’s rights to develop and sell 
his land—both are ways in which the owners exploit and profit 
from their property.111  Similarly, a property owner’s ability to 
exclude trespassers is comparable to the copyright owner’s ability 
 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id.  Liability rules are also ex post rules—that is, the value of the entitlement is 
determined after the injury occurs.  In contrast, the value of a property entitlement can be 
determined before transfer or destruction. 
 107 BeVier, supra note 33, at 136 (“Since the very definition of a property right is that it 
is an ‘exclusive right,’ the Copyright Clause explicitly contemplateS propertization.”). 
 108 JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 422–
24 (3d ed. 1989). 
 109 See BeVier, supra note 33, at 136 (noting that the Copyright Clause does explicitly 
contemplate propertization). 
 110 See SHELDON F. KURTZ, MOYNIHAN’S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 
74 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that a life tenant has a real property owner’s right to 
undisturbed possession and of use and enjoyment of land). 
 111 See BeVier, supra note 33, at 108 (arguing that giving property rights to individuals 
encourages them to use the property in ways that enhances its value). 
LIU_121307_FINAL 12/13/2007  10:08:55 PM 
2008] COPYRIGHT AS QUASI-PUBLIC PROPERTY 407 
to refuse to license his work.112  Both actions involve retaining 
exclusive control and a degree of privacy over one’s property.113  
Likewise, bringing an action for copyright infringement is akin to 
an action for trespass because they target unauthorized uses of 
property.  In this way, copyright is analogous to a property right 
because it relates to how an owner can control, exploit and 
dispense with the copyrighted work. 
Of course, one important difference between copyright and 
ordinary property is the incorporeal nature of intellectual property.  
Unlike tangible property, the copyrighted property does not consist 
of the physical copies of a work, but of the intangible expression 
therein.114  This intangibility means that the boundaries of a 
copyright owner’s property are not as clearly defined as the 
boundaries of ordinary property, such as a piece of land.  
Nevertheless, the owner’s rights are the same—the copyright 
owner holds an exclusive entitlement to the copyrighted 
expression.115  The incorporeal nature of the property does not 
detract from the proprietary nature of the owner’s interest.  
Furthermore, an individual can enjoy a copyrighted work in ways 
that do not apply to ordinary property.  For example, one can 
highlight or annotate his copy of a copyrighted book without 
infringing the copyright owner’s rights.116  In contrast, it is 
 
 112 Id. at 137–38 (“[T]here is a close analogy between what a court does in a copyright 
case and what a judge does who enforces a trespass law . . .”); see CRIBBET & JOHNSON, 
supra note 108, at 422 (describing a property owner’s right to exclude trespassers). 
 113 See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (enjoining 
biographer from reprinting unpublished letters); see also NIMMER, supra note 23, at 
1196–1203 (examining the privacy and copyright interests of persons such as 
photographers and biography subjects). 
 114 See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006); Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 605 (1st Cir. 
1993) (rejecting the argument that copyright ownership is based on physical possession 
of the work). 
 115 BeVier defends the applicability of property rights to copyright by pointing out that 
the property rights perform the same function as copyright.  Whether applied to tangible 
or intangible property, the rights are meant to encourage “optimal production and 
investment.” BeVier, supra note 33, at 112. 
 116 The user’s annotations are not infringing provided that they do not amount to a 
recasting or transformation of the underlying work—in which case, they may infringe the 
owner’s derivative work right.  Additionally, an owner of a copy of a work can sell or 
transfer that copy without violating the copyright owner’s right to distribution or first 
sale. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
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relatively difficult for someone to use another person’s property 
without permission.  Yet this difference only demonstrates the 
public aspects of copyright.  It does not demonstrate that 
intellectual property is not property.  Users’ ability to enjoy 
copyrighted works is predicated on the owner’s decision to make 
the work available to the public.  Although copyright also protects 
unknown, unpublished works, it is unlikely that others could make 
use of these works.117  An important difference between copyright 
law and the laws governing ordinary property is that copyright 
actively encourages the public availability of a work, whereas 
ordinary property rights provide no such incentive.118  Finally, 
copyrighted property is non-rivalrous in nature.119  Books and 
music are not scarce, limited resources in the same way that a tract 
of land is.  Although there are less physical constraints on the 
existence of copyrighted property, the nature of the copyright 
owner’s rights remain the same.120  Despite the intangibility of the 
property, the owner enjoys exclusive ownership in the copyrighted 
expression.  In this way, while there are notable differences 
between copyright and tangible property, they do not change the 
fact that copyright owners possess a proprietary entitlement over 
their works. 
The remedies that are available to a copyright owner further 
illustrate the proprietary nature of copyright.  The Copyright Act 
provides that if there is copyright infringement, the owner is 
entitled to either a temporary or final injunction to prevent further 
 
 117 While it is possible for a person to reproduce an unpublished work without stealing 
it, it is likely that this requires the actual theft of the work or a similar form of 
appropriation.  Like the defendants in Harper & Row, there would be an issue regarding 
the physical appropriation of the author’s property, in addition to the issue of copyright 
infringement. See infra notes 60–79 and accompanying text. 
 118 Property law may encourage an owner to put his land to useful purposes, but it does 
not encourage him to make his land available to the public, for a fee or otherwise. See 
BeVier, supra note 33, at 108 (arguing that property rights give owners an incentive to 
make decisions that will enhance the property’s value). 
 119 Id. at 111. 
 120 BeVier makes a related argument by pointing out that the non-scarcity of 
copyrighted property does not mean it should not be propertized. Id. at 111–14. 
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infringement.121  Injunctive relief is also available to owners of 
ordinary property, who can obtain injunctions to prevent trespass, 
nuisance or other interferences with their property.122  Although 
the courts and legal scholars have recognized that awarding 
damages may be preferable to an injunction in some copyright 
cases—for the reason that injunctions unduly prevent others from 
exercising their right to free speech—the copyright statute makes 
injunctive relief the primary mode of copyright enforcement.123  
This reflects the notion that copyright infringement is not simply a 
contractual or tortious claim for which monetary damages is 
normally adequate compensation. Instead, copyright owners have 
the right to directly enjoin the infringer’s activity, much like an 
owner of real property.124  Nor is the availability of injunctive 
relief, a consequence of the gravity of the offence.  Copyright 
infringement is not an inherently dangerous or irreversible offense 
that requires an injunction in order to provide an effective remedy.  
Rather, copyright’s remedies indicate a parallel to property rights. 
Some have argued that copyright is not a property right 
because the property that it deals with is also speech.126  While an 
ordinary property owner can exclude trespassers for a variety of 
reasons, a copyright owner excludes others because of their 
expression.  In other words, copyright is speech regulation because 
 
 121 The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2007).  The statute also provides for 
impounding orders, damages (including statutory damages), profits, attorney’s fees, and 
criminal penalties. Id. §§ 503–06. 
 122 CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 108, at 397. 
 123 See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 6 (commenting that courts regularly issue 
prepublication and preliminary injunctions in copyright cases); Lemley & Volokh, supra 
note 28, at 158–59 (commenting that preliminary injunctions are the expected remedy 
and plaintiffs are treated favorably); McGowan, supra note 42, at 328–31 (arguing 
against replacing injunctions with damages). But see Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, 
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1130–35 (1990) (arguing that 
damages, rather than injunctions, should be the presumptive mode of remedy); Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (noting that “the goals of copyright 
law . . . are not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief” for 
copyright infringement); Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276 (2001) 
(holding that injunctive relief was improper given the lack of irreparable injury to 
Suntrust and the First Amendment concerns at stake). 
 124 CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 108, at 397. 
 126 See e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 25; Netanel, supra note 16, at 39. 
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it makes speech a part of the offense.127  In this way, copyright is 
comparable to a trespass law that prohibits trespassers because 
they want to hold a political protest.128  Such a law aims directly at 
the speaker’s communicative conduct and, worse still, it targets the 
content of his or her speech.129  However, it is inaccurate to say 
that copyright law always penalizes others for their expressive 
activity.  The prototypical case of copyright infringement involves 
the wholesale reproduction of a copyrighted work without the 
owner’s consent.130  In these cases, it is likely that the defendant 
used the copyrighted work for appropriative purposes rather than 
speech purposes.  Most verbatim copying is done for the purpose 
of simply appropriating the existing work—indeed, that would be 
one reason why the work was copied verbatim in the first place.  
When copyright prohibits such copying, then, it is aimed at 
conduct that does not necessarily implicate speech interests.131  
Moreover, copyright does not penalize copying for the purpose of 
restricting the freedom of expression.132  Copyright prohibits 
copying in order to protect the rights of authors and owners and to 
incentivize the creation of works.  Since the purpose of the 
regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech, copyright does 
not penalize others for their expression, but for their conduct that 
harms the copyright owner’s property rights.  Therefore, copyright 
regulates conduct for its effects on property interests and not for 
the fact that it is speech.133 
 
 127 See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 25–26 (“Copyright law, however, does render 
people liable because they are speaking—and indeed, because of what they say”). 
 128 See id. 
 129 See id. 
 130 See McGowan, supra note 42, at 292 (pointing out that most “garden-variety 
infringement suits” do not implicate the political suppression of speech); see also 
Nimmer, supra note 23 at 1201–03 (arguing that there are cases where there is simply no 
First Amendment justification for the copier’s actions). 
 131 See BeVier, supra note 33, at 139. 
 132 See id. at 139–40. 
 133 See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 27–30 (arguing that copyright cannot be property 
because that would result in too much private power over speech). Rubenfeld assumes 
that copyright is private property, such that it would entitle copyright owners to control 
others’ speech with little censure from the First Amendment). See id. at 27–30 
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It may be, as Tushnet argues, that the mere act of copying 
serves valid speech interests.134  Although this can be true in 
certain cases, there is no principled way to discern which cases of 
copying are speech-related and which are not.  Factors such as the 
intent of the speaker and the surrounding circumstances are likely 
to be highly subjective.135  More importantly, free speech does not 
encompass the right to express oneself in a particular way.  
Generally speaking, free speech is a negative right in that it 
prevents the state from interfering with speech, but it does not 
require the state to provide resources for individuals to make 
speech in any specific way.136  In other words, the First 
Amendment does not guarantee the right to use a particular form of 
expression.  For example, courts apply low level scrutiny to laws 
that regulate the time, place and manner in which speech is made, 
reflecting the fact that the First Amendment does not absolutely 
protect any one method of speech.137  Even categorical restrictions 
may be legitimate if alternate modes of communication are 
available.  For example, the doctrine of fighting words prevents an 
individual from using particularly abusive language to insult 
another, but it does not prevent that individual from expressing the 
same sentiments using different words or in different 
circumstances.138  In the context of copyright, the courts have 
 
 134 Tushnet, supra note 16, at 546. 
 135 Id. at 568, 574 (arguing that copied works can “feel like the products of the copier’s 
own personality and be perceived by others as such,” and that copying a work can “suit 
the situation”). 
 136 Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1203 (noting that the First Amendment protects the right 
to speak, but does not require the government to subsidize speech). 
 137 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (emphasizing that the law 
only prohibited the individual’s speech at certain times of day). But see Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (holding that the speaker was entitled to use his 
particular choice of words to make his expression); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 404 (1989) (holding that flag-burning in protest of the government was protected 
speech).  These cases can be distinguished on the grounds that the particular form of 
expression was inextricably linked to the speaker’s viewpoint, such that prohibiting such 
activity would amount to viewpoint discrimination.  In contrast, prohibiting the specific 
method of copying an existing work does not also penalize the speaker’s viewpoint.  
Copying is infringement whether the speaker expresses a positive or negative message. 
 138 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (noting that a speaker 
like Chaplinsky could have uttered his words in the absence of the police officer, or 
written down his words instead of vocalizing them).  In general, the constitutionality of 
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commented that the Constitution does not require giving a speaker 
the optimal means with which to exercise his speech rights.139  In 
this way, copyright’s prohibition against unauthorized 
reproduction merely reflects the fact that free speech does not 
protect the wholesale copying of a copyrighted work.  Assuming 
that there are other means of expression available, the First 
Amendment does not protect a speaker who chooses the specific 
means of copying an existing work to express himself. 
The more problematic cases are where a speaker does not 
simply reproduce a copyrighted work, but makes his own changes 
or additions to the material.  Unlike wholesale copying, the speaker 
is not merely asserting a right to use a specific, existing means of 
expression.  Instead, the speaker argues that despite copying a 
substantial portion of the original work, he also exercised his right 
to free speech and should receive the protection of the First 
Amendment.140  In these cases, the copyright owner’s property 
interest comes into conflict with the subsequent speaker’s speech 
interest.  The conflict arises because the speaker wants to use an 
existing work for his expressive purposes, but that work is the 
exclusive property of another person.  In other words, copyright 
becomes like a trespass law that prevents a speaker from using 
someone else’s property to conduct a political rally.  Although the 
speaker wishes to use a particular property for his speech, he also 
has a genuine speech interest in using that property.  As such, 
although copyright primarily deals with property rights, there are 
instances where copyright effectively restrains the legitimate 
speech interests of other speakers.  Copyright restricts free speech 
because it prohibits the reproduction of an existing work, even if a 
speaker makes sufficiently expressive additions or alterations.  
While the courts assert that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair 
 
speech restrictions is highly dependent on the surrounding context. See Schenck v. U.S., 
249 U.S. 47 (1919) (setting out the “clear and present danger” test for incitement). 
 139 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2001) (“Fair use has 
never been held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by 
the fair user’s preferred technique or in the format of the original.”).  This case was the 
appellate court’s decision affirming Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. 
Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 140 One must copy a substantial portion of the copyrighted work in order for there to be 
a finding of copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
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use adequately accommodate these concerns, many scholars have 
criticized their effectiveness in respecting the right to free 
speech.141  Given the vagueness of both doctrines and their failure 
to directly address speech interests, they do not sufficiently 
safeguard First Amendment interests.  Therefore, although 
copyright is property, it can nevertheless restrict the speech 
interests of other speakers. 
Copyright is a form of general regulation that primarily deals 
with property but has incidental effects on speech.142  Copyright 
creates a set of property rights for authors and owners to control 
and exploit their works.  Like ordinary property laws, copyright 
does not necessarily restrict the speech interests of others.  
However, consistent with its status as property, there are 
circumstances where copyright can affect the legitimate speech 
interests of other speakers.  As with ordinary property, there are 
situations where the copyright owner’s property rights conflict 
with a subsequent speaker’s right to free speech.  Even a neutral 
trespass law can have speech consequences when it restrains a 
speaker from holding his political rally.143  After all, even as 
property, copyright is not immune from the First Amendment.  
Characterizing the conflict between copyright and free speech as 
being solely about speech is problematic because it is unclear 
whether copyright actually enhances or restricts the right to free 
speech.  Rather, the proper analysis is to weigh the owner’s 
property interest against the subsequent speaker’s speech interest.  
Therefore, while the courts are correct to treat copyright as a form 
of property, they are mistaken to assume that this forecloses the 
free speech arguments.  As property, copyright remains open to 
challenges under the First Amendment.  
 
 141 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 142 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (holding that 
enforcement of a public indecency statute did not violate the First Amendment); City of 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M. t/b/d/a “Kandyland”, 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (holding that public 
indecency statute satisfied the standard for restrictions on symbolic speech). 
 143 Of course, it may be that the prohibition of the rally is justified.  Nonetheless, there 
needs to be a balance between the property interest and the speech interest. 
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B. Copyright is Quasi-Public Property 
As discussed above, the courts’ characterization of copyright as 
property leads them to conclude that copyright satisfies First 
Amendment concerns.  Although the courts do not articulate as 
much, they seem to assume that copyright is a private property 
right belonging to the copyright owner.  Certainly, that would 
explain why there is virtually no analysis of the constitutionality of 
copyright.  Since the Constitution only applies to state action, the 
actions of private property owners are not subject to the First 
Amendment.144  Furthermore, private property is generally not 
subject to the public forum doctrine, which requires certain kinds 
of property to be available for speech purposes.145  If copyright is 
private property, then the constitutional rights of other speakers 
have little bearing on its validity.146 
Indeed, there is a longstanding perception that copyright is a 
form of private property, much like other forms of intellectual 
property.147  Copyright assigns property rights to private 
individuals who have the personal prerogative to reproduce, 
distribute or license their works.148  The state does not dictate how 
or under what circumstances a copyright owner must license his 
work or exercise any of his other exclusive rights.149  Moreover, 
the Copyright Act withholds protection to works created by or 
 
 144 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 19 (1948) (holding that while purely private 
conduct was not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, the courts could not use their 
power to enforce a covenant which would deny persons their equal protection rights). 
 145 Courts have applied the First Amendment to private property in one case, but it has 
not been followed. See Marsh v. Ala., 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (balancing the “Constitutional 
rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and 
religion”); RUSSELL L. WEAVER & DONALD E. LIVELY, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 121 (2003); BeVier, supra note 33, at 122–24 (noting that the First 
Amendment empowers the private property owner with the power to exclude). 
 146 The First Amendment may have some bearing, however, because there are limited 
circumstances where the courts have applied the Constitution to private property 
interests. See Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 at 13, 19 (1948). 
 147 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1135 
(1990) (discussing fair use as an exception to the “copyright owner’s rights of private 
property”). 
 148 See BeVier, supra note 33, 136–37 (emphasizing that the Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution assigns authors rights to reproduce, distribute, and license their works). 
 149 See id. at 137 (stating that copyright is the institutional decision to assign the 
copyright to the private owner). 
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commissioned for the government, suggesting that copyright is 
meant for private individuals only.150  Both the American and 
Canadian courts have characterized copyright as a private right.  
For example, the courts have held that copyright is protected by 
due process and the just compensation clauses of the Constitution, 
in the same way that ordinary property is.151  Similarly, the courts 
have viewed fair use as an exception to the copyright owner’s 
“private property rights in his expression.”152  Interestingly, there 
are also cases where the copyright owner argued that the 
government’s use of his copyrighted work violated his private 
property rights and amounted to a regulatory taking subject to the 
Fifth Amendment.153  In the Canadian context, the court has 
explicitly characterized copyright infringement as a form of 
trespass onto the copyright owner’s private property.154  Thus, 
there is a widely shared belief amongst copyright owners and the 
courts that copyright is a form of private property. 
However, to treat copyright as private property is to ignore the 
underlying purposes of copyright law.  Although copyright grants 
property rights, they are imbued with a public purpose.  By 
enacting copyright law, the government grants exclusive rights to 
authors in order to increase the number of works available to the 
 
 150 See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006) (“Copyright protection under this title is not available for 
any work of the United States Government . . .”); id. § 101 (defining a work of the United 
States Government as “a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States 
Government as part of that person’s official duties”).  See also Practice Mgmt. Info. 
Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that model codes are 
“not subject to copyright holder’s exclusive prerogatives”); Veeck v. S. Building Code 
Congress Int’l Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that federal agencies adoption 
of work as a standard did not render the copyright invalid). 
 151 See, e.g., Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir 1983) (“An interest in copyright 
is a property right protected by the due process and just compensation clause of the 
Constitution.”). 
 152 Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 153 See, e.g., Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 877 F. Supp. 1386, 1392–
93 (1994) (holding that an “interest in copyright is property interest protected by the due 
process clause.”) 
 154 See Cie générale des établissements Michelin v. CAW, [1996] 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348, ¶ 
85 (F.C.T.D.) (Can.) (stating that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not 
confer the right to use “private property—the Plaintiff’s copyright—in the service of 
freedom of expression”). 
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public.155  In other words, copyright is an incentive—the state 
gives the owner the statutory protections of copyright in order to 
encourage the production and communication of his work to the 
public.156  The nature of the copyright owner’s rights is meant to 
facilitate the dissemination of his work to society at large.  With 
the exclusive rights to reproduction and distribution, the owner can 
enjoy the profits from the sale of the work and prevent others from 
usurping those profits.  Likewise, the rights to performance and 
display facilitate the presentation of visual or dramatic works to the 
public.  Even the right of first publication exists for the purpose of 
incentivizing the initial public distribution of the work.157  
Although a work does not need to be published or made known to 
others in order to obtain copyright, copyright has little application 
if a work stays completely private.158  It is only when the owner 
chooses to disseminate his work to the public that copyright’s 
protections become most relevant.  In this way, copyright’s 
exclusive rights relate to the ways in which an owner makes his 
works available to the public. 
Further evidence of copyright’s public purpose is found in the 
Constitution.  The Copyright Clause expressly states that copyright 
is meant to promote the “progress of Science and the useful 
Arts.”159  The progress of the arts involves creating conditions 
whereby authors and owners are encouraged to create works and 
communicate them to others.160  To accomplish this purpose, 
copyright has chosen the means of giving owners certain exclusive 
rights in their works.  With the statutory ability to profit from and 
control the distribution of their works, copyright encourages 
authors to expend their efforts and resources to create more works. 
 
 155 This kind of incentive also underlies patent law, in which a limited monopoly is 
given to the inventor in order to incentivize his disclosure of the new product. 
 156 See BeVier, supra note 33, at 112. 
 157 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002). 
 158 At the same time, it is true that copyright protection exists regardless of whether or 
not an author publishes his work or otherwise makes it public. 
 159 The Constitution provides that Congress has the power to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors, the 
exclusive Right to their Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 160 See Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (2001) (“The Copyright 
Act promotes public access to knowledge because it provides an economic incentive for 
authors to publish books and disseminate ideas to the public.”). 
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In this way, property rights are a means to an end.  Copyright 
grants property rights for the ultimate purpose of encouraging the 
continual creation of works for the benefit of the public.  Indeed, 
many scholars have argued that the public purpose of copyright 
ought to play a greater role in the understanding of copyright.  
Although authors and owners have private rights over their works, 
the public has an equally important right to be able to access and 
enjoy those works.161  Copyright includes the rights of copyright 
owners as well as users.162 
The public purpose of copyright is also reflected in the 
Copyright Clause’s requirement that copyright be granted to 
authors for “limited times.”163  The term “limited times” means 
that the period of time in which an owner enjoys copyright’s 
privileges must be finite.  The purpose of limiting the term is to 
prevent owners from having perpetual control over their works.  
After the owner has been given a reasonable amount of time to 
exploit his work, the work loses copyright protection and falls into 
the public domain. In this way, the limited times requirement 
ensures that copyrighted works will eventually enter the public 
domain where it is available to the public without restrictions.164  
Although Congress has continually extended the copyright term 
and such extensions have been found to be constitutional, the 
courts make it clear that the Constitution requires the copyright 
term to have a definite expiry date.165  In this way, the limited 
duration of copyright ensures that works will eventually be fully 
available to the public. 
Given copyright’s public purposes, it is more properly 
characterized as quasi-public property.  Although authors and 
owners possess somewhat private rights over their works, these 
rights serve an important public purpose.  They are meant to 
 
 161 See Craig, supra note 19, at 76 (arguing that copyright should serve the speech 
interests of the broader community). 
 162 See Richard Bronaugh, Peter Barton, & Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View 
of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 3 (2003). 
 163 Supra note 159. 
 164 See Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1262 (describing the goal of the Copyright Clause as 
ensuring that works enter the public domain after the author’s rights expire). 
 165 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209–10 (2003) (noting that regime of perpetual 
copyrights was not included in any of the copyright acts). 
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encourage the creation and dissemination of works for the benefit 
of the public.  Unlike rights in real property, which have roots in 
natural law and the structure of government, copyright is a 
statutory creation imbued with a specific purpose.166  The 
copyright owner’s rights owe their existence to the Copyright Act 
and are governed entirely by that statute.167  Thus, copyright must 
be interpreted in light of the statute’s purposes.  Copyright does not 
give property rights to authors and owners for their own sake, but 
for the overarching goal of furthering the progress of the arts.  Of 
course, copyright is not purely public property.  Public property 
usually consists of property owned by the government or private 
individuals that is generally accessible to the public.168  Although 
the state can regulate public property, in general it cannot exclude 
others from making reasonable uses of the property.169  In contrast, 
copyright is more exclusive in that the owner can control the ways 
in which his work is used or deny its use altogether.170  However, 
the private aspects of the owner’s rights must be moderated by the 
public purposes of copyright.  Since the owner’s rights are 
statutory creations, they must adhere to the legislative purposes for 
copyright.  Therefore, since copyright has both private and public 
aspects, it is best viewed as a form of quasi-public property. 
In this light, the doctrines of the idea/expression dichotomy and 
fair use can be understood as ways of ensuring that the public 
benefits from copyrighted works.  The idea/expression dichotomy 
establishes that the expression in the work belongs exclusively to 
 
 166 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch. 5 (1689) 
(treating property as a natural right that flows from a person mixing his labour with 
nature).  Property rights are also explicitly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution—“[N]or 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 167 GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 4, at 6 (stating that the courts have found that 
copyright does not exist at common law and is entirely a creation of Congress). 
 168 Shopping malls are an example of privately owned property that could be considered 
public property. 
 169 See WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 113–14 (describing how public forums 
are subject only to content-neutral regulation). 
 170 For a discussion about the consequences when copyright owners fail to license the 
use of their works, see Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and 
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 
(1982); Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won’t Sell: Parody, Fair Use and Efficiency in 
Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79 (1991). 
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the copyright owner, but the ideas are available to the public.171  
Others are free to borrow the ideas contained in the copyrighted 
work because they are not protected by copyright.  Although the 
distinction between ideas and expression is notoriously vague, the 
doctrine nevertheless ensures that with every copyrighted work, 
there are ideas in it that are free for the public to use and borrow 
from.172  Similarly, the fair use defense is not only a safety valve 
for free speech, but a way to allow the public to use copyrighted 
works in productive ways.173  The enumerated fair use categories 
of criticism, review, commentary and news reporting are all 
endeavors that are particularly useful to the public.174  Apart from 
an author’s personal speech interest in writing a movie review, for 
example, the public benefits from the information and opinions 
contained in the article.  Fair use does not simply defend against 
copyright’s encroachments on speech, but actively promotes those 
uses of copyrighted works that are beneficial to society.  Thus, 
these doctrines help serve copyright’s purpose of increasing the 
availability of works to the public. 
It could be argued that copyright is exclusively private property 
because the state assigns copyright to private individuals. Instead 
of creating a state-owned or state-monitored system whereby the 
government owns and controls copyrighted works, the Copyright 
Act confers copyright and its exclusive rights on parties in their 
private capacity.175  Indeed, in Michelin the court explicitly refused 
to treat copyright as quasi-public property.176  The court reasoned 
 
 171 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1879); see also Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (outlining Judge Learned Hand’s oft-quoted 
statement about how to discern a work’s idea from its expression). 
 172 See Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (2001) (describing how 
the idea/expression dichotomy “embodies the First Amendment’s underlying goal of 
encouraging open debate and the free exchange of ideas”). 
 173 Andrew Inesi, A Theory of De Minimis and a Proposal for its Application to 
Copyright, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 983 (2006) (describing fair use as a safety valve 
that avoids overly “rigid application of the copyright statute” (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 
495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990))). The safety valve rationale also underlies the freedom of 
speech. See Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1188 (discussing a balancing of the interests of the 
creator and the interests of free speech). 
 174 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (providing that the purposes of criticism, comments, 
news reporting, teaching, scholarship and research can be shielded by fair use). 
 175 See BeVier, supra note 33, at 107–08, 113. 
 176 Cie générale des établissements Michelin v. CAW, [1996] 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348 (Can.). 
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that the existence of a state-sanctioned copyright system did not 
render it public.177  Although the court did not elaborate, it seemed 
to accept that copyright is private property because it is owned by 
private individuals.178  However, the fact that copyright belongs to 
individuals does not diminish the fact that it is a statutory creation 
with a public purpose.  The Copyright Act defines the owner’s 
rights and their meaning must be interpreted in light of the statute’s 
goals.179  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court’s own declaration that 
copyright is the “engine of free expression” belies its inextricable 
link to a public purpose.180  Copyright is an institution that is 
meant to further the basic values of the First Amendment—that is, 
the creation and distribution of speech to the general public.181  
Thus, although copyright grants rights to private individuals, it 
must incorporate the public goals of copyright law in order to be 
consistent with its own statutory grant.182  In this way, copyright is 
distinguishable from ordinary property laws because the state does 
not encourage property owners to make their property available to 
the public.  Rather, property rights are granted for the purpose of 
simply allocating ownership of a scarce resource and encouraging 
the beneficial use of property.183 
Furthermore, it is inaccurate to suggest that copyright is private 
property simply because it is the copyright owner who possesses 
the right.184  The identity of the property owner is not 
determinative of whether the property is public or private.  For 
example, the government owns many properties that would not be 
regarded as public.  The Oval Office or judges’ chambers are 
properties that are owned by the state, but their function and 
 
 177 Id. at ¶ 102.  The court stated that copyright’s registration under a state-formulated 
system did not diminish the private nature of copyright. But see, Craig, supra note 19, at 
95 (stating that a lower court was overstepping its bounds by declaring copyright to be a 
form of private property). 
 178 Cie générale des établissements Michelin v. CAW, [1996] 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348, ¶ 102 
(Can.). 
 179 See Craig, supra note 19, at 95 (noting that copyright is statutory law and therefore 
legislation must respect its statutory purposes as well as Charter values). 
 180 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 181 Craig, supra note 19, at 108–10. 
 182 Id. at 113. 
 183 See BeVier, supra note 33, at 112–13. 
 184 See id. at 137. 
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purpose make them essentially private places.185  These examples 
suggest that the purposes to which a property is put to influence 
whether it is public or private.  Moreover, unlike private property 
laws, copyright contains its own exceptions for public uses.  
Through the doctrine of fair use, the state requires copyrighted 
property to accommodate other individuals’ interests.  A book 
reviewer may borrow from the book as long as it satisfies the 
conditions for fair use.  The Copyright Act also contains numerous 
exceptions for libraries, archives, and educational institutions 
which use copyrighted works for public purposes.186  Therefore, it 
does not matter that the state does not own copyright or control a 
copyright owner’s use of his property.  The public nature of 
copyright derives from the statute’s public purposes, irrespective 
of to whom the rights are assigned.  At the same time, it is true that 
copyright grants its property rights to private individuals who have 
substantial control over how that property is used.  Given the co-
existence of these public and private features, copyright ought to 
be viewed as quasi-public property. 
C. Re-Characterizing the Conflict as Between Property  
and Speech 
Treating copyright as property clarifies the conflict between 
copyright and speech.  When copyright is viewed as speech 
regulation, there is an inevitable stalemate between the speech 
rights of the author and the subsequent speaker.  Both parties can 
claim a right to free speech, and the First Amendment does not 
provide a clear basis for determining whose claim should 
prevail.187  This is exacerbated by the fact that copyright’s benefits 
and burdens do not necessarily fall on any particular group of 
speakers.  Copyright owners can also be subsequent speakers, and 
vice versa.188  Given the ease of obtaining copyright and the wide 
 
 185 See generally WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 113. 
186 See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (subject to certain conditions, “it is not an infringement of 
copyright for a library or archives, or any of its employees acting within the scope of 
their employment, to reproduce no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work”). 
 187 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.  The analysis is particularly complex 
when copyright claims to have already accommodated others’ speech rights. See 
McGowan, supra note 42, at 332–33. 
 188 See McGowan, supra note 42, at 301. 
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availability of copyrighted works, there is little difficulty for an 
individual to be both a copyright owner and someone who borrows 
from other people’s works.  As such, it is not clear whether 
copyright prefers one speaker’s interests over another’s.  
Moreover, when copyright is regarded as speech regulation, it 
possesses an internal logic that is somewhat inconsistent.  It seems 
contradictory for copyright to claim that it can enhance speech 
overall by restricting the speech of some.  In general, courts are 
highly skeptical of arguments that the freedom of speech can be 
served by limiting some kinds of speech.189  Therefore, treating 
copyright as speech regulation makes it difficult to determine 
whether copyright strikes the right balance between the speech 
interests on both sides. 
On the other hand, if copyright is treated as property, there is 
no need to resolve this conundrum.  The courts weigh the 
copyright owner’s property interest against the conceptually 
separate speech interest of the defendant.  The conflict between 
copyright and the First Amendment is a clash between property 
and speech, instead of between the speech rights of different 
parties.  In this way, the courts do not need to decide whose speech 
interest they want to favor and whose speech interest they are 
consequently disfavoring.  Instead, they can simply determine 
whether the copyright owner’s property interest justifies the 
infringement on the defendant’s speech rights. 
At the same time, copyright is not a private property right that 
is completely immune from the Constitution.  Given the public 
purposes of copyright law, the property rights of authors and 
owners are meant to facilitate the greater volume and availability 
of speech to the general public.  Since copyright is a quasi-property 
interest, it must be evaluated for whether it adequately 
accommodates the speech interests of others. 
 
 189 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (holding in part that limiting 
independent political expenditures and fixing a ceiling on campaign expenditures is 
unconstitutional as impermissibly burdening the right of free expression); Denver Area 
Educ. Telecomm. Consortium Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 297 (1996) (holding in part that 
a provision permitting the operator of a public access channel to prohibit patently 
offensive or indecent programming violates the First Amendment). 
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III. COPYRIGHT & THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE 
If copyright is quasi-public property, how must it 
accommodate the right to free speech?  One way of answering this 
question is to analogize copyright to a public forum that must meet 
First Amendment standards.  There is a well-developed 
jurisprudence dealing with the constitutional right to use public 
forums for expressive purposes.190  Free speech is primarily a 
negative right to be free from governmental interference.191  It does 
not necessarily grant individuals the right to access places or 
resources in order to make speech.192  Nonetheless, the courts have 
recognized that in order for free speech to be a meaningful right, 
some places or venues must be available to the public for speech 
purposes.  Accordingly, the courts have considered different kinds 
of public forums and what kinds of speech restrictions may 
justifiably be placed on these places. 
If copyright is a public forum, then the conflict between 
copyright and free speech is between the copyright owner’s 
property rights and the subsequent speaker’s interest in using the 
copyrighted work as a forum.  The conflict arises because a 
speaker wishes to use an existing work as a forum for his speech, 
but that forum is property that belongs to the copyright owner.  In 
this way, the tension between copyright and free speech does not 
pit the speech interests of one person against another’s, but deals 
with the more familiar First Amendment question of whether a 
forum ought to accommodate the kind of speech that the defendant 
wants to make. 
A. Overview of the Public Forum Doctrine in the U.S. & Canada 
The First Amendment recognizes that individuals have a right 
to use public forums for speech purposes and limits the 
government’s ability to regulate these places.  The term “public 
 
 190 See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1965). 
 191 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 192 Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1203 (“The First Amendment guarantees the right to 
speak; it does not offer a governmental subsidy for the speaker, and particularly a subsidy 
at the expense of authors whose well-being is also a matter of public interest.”). 
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forum” refers to property that is, for the most part, open to the 
public to use for speech.193  In the United States, the courts 
distinguish between three kinds of forums: traditional public 
forums, designated public forums, and nonpublic forums.  
Traditional public forums are those places that are historically 
viewed as being open to the public, such as streets, sidewalks and 
parks.194  Designated public forums refer to places that are not 
traditionally open to the public, but have been designated by the 
state to be used for speech or assembly purposes.195  For example, 
the government may open up a school auditorium for the purpose 
of holding a town hall meeting.  Nonpublic forums include 
government-owned property that is closed to the expressive 
activities of the general public, such as courtrooms or the Oval 
Office.196  The existence of nonpublic forums reflects the fact that 
not all public property must serve as a forum for speech.  With 
regards to private property, the public forum doctrine generally 
does not apply.197  Since the Constitution only applies to state 
action, property belonging to private parties is not subject to the 
First Amendment.198 
In public forums, the government may regulate speech only if 
there is a compelling state objective and the means chosen is 
 
 193 See WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 113. 
 194 See Hague v. Comm. Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of 
streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public and . . . for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions.”). 
 195 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 
(defining designated public forums as those where the state opens property “for use by 
the public as a place for expressive activity”). 
 196 See WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 113.  Other examples include jails and 
teachers’ mailboxes. Id. 
 197 Id. at 121. 
 198 See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972).  While this is true, as a general 
matter, there have been cases that suggested there is a right to use private property for 
speech purposes. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan 
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968) (holding that when owners sufficiently open 
up their property to the public their First Amendment rights will apply). Lloyd Corp., 407 
U.S. 551 (1972); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
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narrowly tailored to achieve that objective.199  Generally speaking, 
the regulations must be content-neutral and leave open alternate 
methods of communication.200  For example, a law that restricts the 
times of day or the volume of speech in a public park is justified in 
the interests of protecting citizens from unwanted noise, but a 
wholesale prohibition of distributing leaflets is not a justified 
means of controlling litter.201  Thus, these cases demonstrate that 
while public forums are available for a wide variety of speech 
purposes, it is permissible for the government to impose minimal 
restrictions for non-speech related reasons where there are ample 
alternate means of expression available.  These regulations are 
often referred to as “time, place, and manner” regulations because 
they merely govern the form of expression, as opposed to its 
content or viewpoint.202 
The Canadian courts take a different approach in their public 
forum analysis.203  In the seminal case of Committee for the 
Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, a divided Supreme Court 
articulated three different ways to determine the availability of 
public places for expressive purposes.204  This case involved the 
members of a political group who distributed leaflets at a public 
airport.205  The group claimed they had a right to use the airport as 
a forum for their expression.206  Writing for three members of the 
 
 199 Perry Education Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.  In other words, the applicable standard of 
scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny.  For a discussion of the intermediate scrutiny standard, 
see supra note 38. 
 200 See WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 116. 
 201 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (upholding a municipal regulation 
requiring performers to use certain sound equipment and technicians for concert in New 
York City’s Central Park); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (invalidating an 
ordinance prohibiting distribution of handbills on public streets because it restricted the 
right to free speech more than necessary to control litter). 
 202 See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
 203 The American courts’ categorical approach to public forums has been criticized as 
being overly rigid and placing undue emphasis on physical places instead of the free 
speech values at stake. See C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: 
Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109, 110 (1986); see also 
Comm. for the Commonwealth v. Can., [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139, ¶ 9 (Can.) (Lamer J. 
explicitly declining to follow the American public forum jurisprudence). 
 204 Comm. for the Commonwealth, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 (Can.). 
 205 Id. ¶ 52. 
 206 Id. ¶ 53. 
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Court, Justice Lamer held that the freedom of expression does not 
grant an unqualified right to use public forums for speech.207  An 
individual has a right to communicate in a public forum only 
where his communication is compatible with the principal function 
of that place.208  For example, a speaker has no right to shout 
political messages in a library, but may wear a t-shirt bearing those 
messages.209  In contrast, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé emphasized that 
the freedom of expression encompasses a right to use public 
property for speech and any restrictions must be justified under § 1 
of the Charter, the limitations clause.210  Accordingly, the right to 
use government property for speech involves a consideration of 
various factors, such as the traditional status of the place, whether 
the public is ordinarily admitted, and the compatibility of the place 
with the expression.211  Under this approach, the courts balance the 
individual’s speech interest against the government’s interest to 
determine if there is a right to access a particular forum.212  Lastly, 
Justice McLachlin’s opinion struck a middle ground. While she 
agreed that the freedom of expression did not confer an absolute 
right to use government property, the degree to which a forum is 
available to the public depends on whether the expression is tied to 
one of the underlying values for expression.213  When the speakers’ 
use of the forum is related to the attainment of truth, political 
participation, or individual self-fulfillment, they have a claim to 
access government property for its expression.214 
Thus, the foregoing summary of U.S. and Canadian public 
forum doctrine outlines several different approaches to 
determining the extent to which public property must be available 
to the public for speech purposes.  The courts consider a variety of 
criteria, including the traditional or designated function of a place, 
its compatibility with speech, and the underlying speech values at 
 
 207 Id. ¶ 9. 
 208 Id. ¶ 17. 
 209 Id. ¶ 18. 
 210 Id. ¶ 114. 
 211 Id. ¶ 148. 
 212 See id. ¶¶150–56. 
 213 Id. ¶ 243. 
 214 Id. ¶¶ 243–44. 
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stake.  All of these considerations can help determine how 
copyright ought to accommodate the speech interests of others. 
B. Copyright as a Public Forum 
How is copyright a public forum? If copyright creates property 
rights in intangible expression, and these rights serve a public 
purpose, the copyrighted work can be conceived of as an 
incorporeal space containing ideas and expression.  Every 
copyrighted work consists of expressive property owned by the 
copyright owner, and expression or ideas that are available to the 
public.  By enacting the Copyright Act, the state sanctions the 
creation of forums in which both copyright owners and the public 
have an interest.  These copyright forums serve many expressive 
purposes.  First, the forum provides copyrighted works to the 
public.  As discussed above, copyright grants exclusive rights to 
authors and owners in order to encourage them to distribute and 
disseminate their works to others.215  With copyright’s protections, 
authors and owners can allow the public to enjoy their works 
without the fear of misappropriation or the loss of control over 
their works. Second, the copyright forum allows others to use and 
access copyrighted works.  Individuals can read books and enjoy 
music as part of their First Amendment rights to access literature, 
the arts, and other materials that lead to a more informed and 
enlightened citizenry.216  Third, and most importantly, the forum 
allows owners and users to share copyrighted works amongst 
themselves.  Although copyright owners have exclusive rights over 
the copyrighted expression, the unprotected ideas are available to 
subsequent speakers for expressive purposes.  And, although the 
expression is the exclusive property of the copyright owner, the 
fair use doctrine requires that it be made available to other 
speakers for certain purposes that are beneficial to the public.  In 
all these ways, copyright acts as an intangible public forum that 
serves many speech-related purposes. 
 
 215 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
216 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 
245, 246. 
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Indeed, the courts acknowledge that public forums need not be 
tangible places.  In Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the 
University of Virginia, a religious publication was denied funding 
from a university fund that subsidized the costs of student 
publications.217  This was challenged as being unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment.218  The 
Court described the university’s student publication fund as a 
forum that was “metaphysical” rather than “spatial or 
geographic.”219  Nevertheless, the rules governing public forums 
applied.220  Since the university created the fund in order to 
facilitate student speech, the fund was an intangible public 
forum.221 
Similarly, copyright is an incorporeal forum that owes its 
existence to state action.  Through the Copyright Act, the state has 
created a system of entitlements for copyright owners that 
encourages them to disseminate their work to the public and 
ensures that the public can enjoy these works.  Unlike the fund in 
Rosenberger, the government’s grant of copyright protection does 
not directly subsidize authors’ speech but uses the more indirect 
means of granting property rights to authors and owners.  
Nevertheless, these property rights perform the same function as 
the university fund—they incentivize the creation of speech and its 
availability to the general public. 
Hence, copyright is analogous to a traditional or designated 
public forum because copyrighted property is meant to serve a 
distinct public purpose.  Although the courts have not recognized 
copyright as a traditional public forum, it has many of the same 
characteristics.  The courts describe traditional forums as those that 
are “immemorially . . . held in trust for the use of the public” and 
whose use forms part of the rights and liberties of citizens.222  
Likewise, copyright has a longstanding history in English law 
which, through the adoption of the Statute of Anne in 1710, 
 
 217 515 U.S. 819, 824, 830 (1995). 
 218 Id. at 827. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 830. 
 221 See id. 
 222 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
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created copyright law to protect authors and make their works 
accessible to the public.223  In 1776, the U.S. Constitution formally 
adopted this notion of copyright and expressly gave the federal 
government the power to enact the Copyright Act.224  This statute 
reflects many of the principles that are found in the original Statute 
of Anne.225  Thus, copyright has an extensive history of facilitating 
speech that dates back to the adoption of the Constitution, as well 
as the common law and English statutes that preceded it.  
Copyright has the historical underpinnings of a right that has long 
been recognized as a way of facilitating speech.  Moreover, the 
definition of traditional public forums should not be static but 
ought to embrace new places that play the same role as traditional 
forums.226  Just as streets for automobile traffic were not envisaged 
at “time immemorial,” copyright can qualify as a traditional public 
forum even though it did not fall under the original definition.  The 
Internet is an example of new technology that functions as a public 
forum because it provides an arena for speech and communication 
that is open and easily accessible.  Indeed, the courts’ recognition 
of parks and sidewalks as traditional forums is itself relatively 
recent.227  Therefore, although the courts have not treated 
copyright as a traditional public forum in the past, there is no 
principled reason why they cannot begin to do so. 
Even if copyright is not a traditional public forum, it qualifies 
as a designated public forum.  The cases indicate that the key 
factor in determining whether a place is a designated public forum 
is the government’s intention.228  By enacting the Copyright Act, 
the state expressly created a property regime to fulfill the public 
purpose of promoting the progress of the arts.  Congress’ 
 
 223 See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 4, at 2–3; see also Suntrust Bank v. Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Statute of Anne was [meant] 
to encourage creativity and ensure that the public would have free access to 
information.”). 
 224 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 225 See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 4, at 4–5. 
 226 But see United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205–06 (2003) (holding 
that “doctrines surrounding traditional public forums may not be extended to situations 
where such history is lacking” such as the Internet). 
 227 See WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 114. 
 228 See id. at 118; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983). 
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legislative action in creating a comprehensive copyright scheme 
demonstrates a clear intention to create a forum that facilitates 
speech.  Although a state is not bound to create a designated forum 
nor keep it open indefinitely, during the period in which the 
property is open to speech it is treated as though it was a traditional 
public forum.229  Thus, once the state decided to create copyright 
law, it can be treated like any other public forum for the duration 
of its existence.  Moreover, the government’s purposes help define 
the nature and extent to which the forum has been designated for 
speech purposes.  As argued above, there is a close connection 
between copyright and its public purposes.  The nature of owners’ 
rights is such that copyrighted works are meant to be distributed 
and disseminated to the public.  Therefore, the copyright forum 
was created for the purpose of making works available to others.  
In addition, Congress’ decision to make copyright widely available 
indicates its intention to expand the breadth of the forum in which 
speech is to be accommodated.  By giving copyright protection to a 
wide range of owners and works, copyright seeks to widen the 
forum in which the public can engage.  Therefore, copyright law 
creates a designated forum that is meant to facilitate a broad range 
of speech and a wide right of public access. 
An obvious example of the forum-like nature of copyright is 
the concept of the public domain.230  The works in the public 
domain consist of those whose copyright protection has expired or 
could not receive copyright in the first place.  Within this domain, 
a vast array of expressive material, including Shakespearean plays 
and his plot device of star-crossed lovers are available for public 
use, without any of copyright’s constraints.231  The public domain 
is essentially the intangible equivalent of public forums.  The 
public can make use of works in the public domain as freely as 
they can take to the streets for speech.  Like sidewalks and parks, 
 
 229 See WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 118. 
 230 See Rebecca Tushnet, Domain and Forum: Public Space, Public Freedom, 30 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 597, 598 (2007); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Censorship, Copyright, 
and Free Speech: Some Tentative Skepticism About the Campaign to Impose First 
Amendment Restrictions on Copyright Law, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 17, 27 
(2003). 
 231 There remains the possibility of non-copyright-related constraints, such as privacy, 
defamation, or the right to publicity. 
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the public domain is not owned by anyone but is collectively 
owned by the public.232  Most importantly, they serve a similar 
purpose: they ensure that there is space, both physically and 
metaphysically, for people to make speech and communicate it to 
others.  In this way, the public domain fulfills the First 
Amendment promise of having places available for free speech, 
just as public forums do. 
However, the analogy is not limited to the public domain.  All 
works, whether copyrighted or uncopyrighted, have the potential to 
be used as a venue for speech, and all works, whether copyrighted 
or uncopyrighted, are subject to the First Amendment.  As argued 
above, copyrighted works are quasi-public property and the extent 
to which they must be available to the public depends on an 
evaluation of the copyright owner’s property interest and the 
public’s speech rights.  Uncopyrighted works in the public domain 
are true public forums—completely public property that is freely 
accessible to the public and unconstrained by copyright’s property 
regime.  In other words, the public domain is a good example of 
how copyright is a public forum, but the analogy applies to all of 
copyright. 
C. How Copyright Measures Up as a Public Forum 
Generally speaking, copyright is consistent with the public 
forum doctrine.  Under the First Amendment, time, place and 
manner regulations can apply to speech in public forums if there 
are ample alternatives for communication.233  By prohibiting the 
wholesale reproduction of copyrighted works, copyright only 
prohibits a specific manner of expression.  The speaker is free to 
borrow small portions of the copyrighted work or create a similar 
message using uncopyrighted expression.  Thus, the speaker has 
many alternative ways to express his idea.  Moreover, copyright’s 
 
 232 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (holding that public 
forums are property being “held in trust for the use of the public.”). See also Julie Cohen, 
Copyright, Commodification and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE 
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 124–66 (L. Guibault & P.B. Hugenholtz eds. 2006) 
(comparing the public domain to a “cultural landscape” whereby people can use material 
in creative ways). 
 233 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
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prohibition of copying is not directed against the content of the 
defendant’s speech.  Since copyright penalizes a reproduction for 
its physical similarity to the original work, the restriction does not 
depend on understanding the meaning of the copied defendant’s 
speech.234  In addition, the purpose of copyright is unrelated to the 
suppression of speech.  Copyright’s prohibition of unauthorized 
reproduction is meant to protect the property rights of authors and 
owners.  By enforcing these property rights, copyright seeks to 
incentivize the future creation of copyrighted works, not to restrict 
the speech of others.  Therefore, in its overall scheme, copyright 
imposes narrow and acceptable limits on expression that uses 
copyrighted property. 
However, as discussed above, copyright’s constitutionality is 
less clear in the case of non-verbatim copying.235  While 
copyright’s penalizing of such speech remains unrelated to the 
suppression of speech and its content, there are cases where the 
defendant may have few alternatives for expression.  Parodies 
provide an illuminating example.  By definition, a parody is a work 
that mimics the original in order to convey a different, often 
critical message.236  A parodist quotes from an existing work in 
order to criticize the work itself.237  The courts have recognized 
that a parodist must be able to borrow enough to conjure up the 
original work and may borrow further material if it is 
reasonable.238  In this way, there is a clear need for a parodist to be 
able to use the original work.  In fact, the original work is 
indispensable to the parodist because the sheer existence of the 
parody depends on the use of the work.  In other words, the only 
means of creating a parody is to borrow from an existing work.  
The parodist does not have the alternative of using a different or 
 
 234 Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 48–49. 
 235 See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
 236 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994). 
 237 Id. at 569–70 (“[T]he heart of any parodist’s claim . . . is the use of some elements of 
a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that 
author’s works.”). 
 238 Id. at 588 (“Once enough has been taken to assure identification, how much more is 
reasonable will depend, say, on the extent to which the song’s overriding purpose and 
character is to parody the original or, in contrast, the likelihood that the parody may serve 
as market substitute for the original.”). 
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uncopyrighted work because the nature of the genre compels the 
use of the original work.  Therefore, if copyright prohibits a 
parody, it is likely to fail the constitutional requirement of leaving 
alternative means of expression available.  Given the very nature 
of parodies, there is only one way of creating a parody and that is 
to borrow from the original work. 
At the same time, this does not mean that the parodist has 
license to commit copyright infringement.239  It is possible for a 
parodist to borrow from the original work without taking so much 
expression that would constitute infringement.  Since copyright is 
quasi-public property, there are portions of the property (for 
instance, the ideas) that are available to the public to use. Although 
the parodist has a speech interest to create his parody, his interest 
must be weighed against the copyright owner’s property interest.  
But since the nature of parody is such that the parodist can only 
express himself through a single means—that is, by borrowing 
from the copyrighted work—the First Amendment suggests that 
the speech interest ought to prevail. 
Many scholars argue that if parodies can justify copyright 
infringement, then so should satires.240  A satire uses an existing 
work to mock or ridicule something other than the work itself, such 
as politics or societal norms.241  Like parodies, satires often convey 
a transformative, critical message that reflects the genuine speech 
interests of the speaker.  However, in terms of property interests, 
copyright’s restriction against satires is justified.  Copyright 
prohibits a satirist from copying an existing work, but leaves open 
numerous means of communication.  Unlike a parodist, a satirist 
does not necessarily have to use a particular work to create his 
satire, but can choose from an array of works that are conducive to 
his satirical purposes.  For example, an author who wants to 
ridicule the O.J. Simpson trial using well-known children’s stories 
can choose between the copyrighted books of Dr. Seuss or 
 
 239 See id. at 581. 
 240 Michael C. Albin, Beyond Fair Use: Putting Satire in its Proper Place, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 518 (1985); Adriana Collado, Note, Unfair Use: The Lack of Fair Use Protection 
for Satire Under § 107 of the Copyright Act, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 65 (2004). 
 241 See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 500 (2d ed. 1989). 
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traditional fairy tales that belong in the public domain.242  In fact, 
the author is not barred from borrowing elements from the Dr. 
Seuss books as long as he does not copy a substantial part of the 
copyrighted expression.243  As such, the prohibition against 
satirists’ copyright infringement meets constitutional scrutiny 
because the speaker has alternative modes of expression.  The 
copyright owner’s property rights prevail over the satirists’ speech 
rights because there is no compelling reason why the satirist must 
use a particular piece of property to make his speech.  Since the 
First Amendment does not guarantee that a speaker can use his 
selected means of expression, satires do not deserve special 
treatment under copyright law. 
Furthermore, the public forum doctrine provides that the 
interest behind the regulation must be unrelated to the suppression 
of speech.  Since copyright confers property rights for the purpose 
of promoting the creation of works, copyright generally has a 
speech-enhancing purpose.  However, copyright owners can utilize 
copyright to suppress speech.  In Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin 
Company, the likely reason why the copyright owner sued the 
defendant for copyright infringement was because the owner 
disapproved of the defendant’s message.244  This is because the 
copyright owner had a practice of censoring other authors’ use of 
its work so that they would not “write anything about 
miscegenation or homosexuality.”245  Additionally, there was little 
evidence that the defendant’s work had any adverse economic 
impact on the original.246  Since the owner appeared to be 
motivated to suppress the defendant’s speech, it was proper for the 
court to favor a finding of fair use.  Although copyright is usually 
speech-neutral, as applied by the copyright owner in Suntrust, it 
 
 242 See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (1997) (granting a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting the publication and distribution of a book that 
recounted the story of the O.J. Simpson trial in the style of Dr. Seuss). 
 243 See id. at 1398. 
 244 268 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 245 See id. 
 246 Id. at 1276. Judge Marcus in his concurring opinion noted that this gave the 
subversive nature of Randall’s novel additional relevance. Id. at 1282.  For an interesting 
discussion of the Suntrust case in terms of copyright’s treatment of sexualized works, see 
Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U.J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273, 294–300 (2007). 
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restricted another person’s speech based on its content.  In other 
words, Suntrust did not use copyright in accordance with its 
normal purposes, but used it for the specific purpose of censoring 
the defendant’s speech.  Moreover, the fact that the defendant 
prevailed in this case indicates that copyright is not a purely 
private right.  Ordinarily, a private property owner is entitled to 
exclude others if he disapproves of the content of their speech.  A 
homeowner has the prerogative to prevent a pro-choice rally from 
occurring on his lawn without violating the First Amendment.  Yet 
the court implicitly accepts that copyright has a public dimension 
when it recognized the defendant’s speech interest in Suntrust.  
The court assumed that copyright is meant to serve public purposes 
and therefore should not be used to infringe the defendant’s 
legitimate speech interests.247  By preventing a copyright owner 
from using copyright to suppress speech, the court implicitly 
recognized the public nature of copyright and how it is subject to 
the First Amendment. 
The Canadian public forum jurisprudence provides further 
guidance for how copyright ought to accommodate free speech.  
Justice Lamer’s approach in Committee for the Commonwealth 
emphasized the compatibility between expression and a particular 
forum.248  A speaker has the right to use a public place if his 
speech is compatible with the function of that place.  The notion of 
compatibility cannot refer to the property owner’s approval of the 
other speaker’s message, or whether the original work was 
intended to be used in these new ways.  This would turn copyright 
into a tool of viewpoint discrimination that would be clearly 
unjustified under the First Amendment and the Charter’s freedom 
of expression.249  Instead, compatibility refers to a functional 
analysis that turns on whether the speaker’s use of the property 
would impair the integrity of the property’s function.  In other 
words, speech is compatible if it does not threaten the property 
 
 247 Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1260–61. 
 248 Comm. for the Commonwealth v. Can., [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 (Can.). 
 249 To borrow Justice Lamer’s example, it would not make sense if a librarian could 
prohibit a speaker from wearing a political t-shirt in a library if the librarian did not 
support those political views. Id. at ¶ 18. 
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owner’s ability to exercise his property rights.250  Copyright 
incorporates this notion of compatibility through the statutory 
defense of fair use.  For example, fair use considers the impact of 
the defendant’s work on the market for the original.251  If the 
defendant’s work is an effective market substitute for the original, 
then it is likely that the owner’s rights over his work have been 
compromised.  With a substitute in the market, the owner cannot 
profit from the reproduction and distribution of his work.  
Conversely, if the defendant’s work does not affect the market for 
the original, it is likely that the copyright owner retains the ability 
to exercise his exclusive rights.  Therefore, the market impact 
factor assesses compatibility because it looks at whether the 
defendant’s use has impaired the copyright owner’s ability to enjoy 
his exclusive rights.  Market impact is important not because it is 
relevant to free speech, but because it is relevant to the owner’s 
property rights.  Indeed, the economic effect of speech is not 
usually considered in the First Amendment analysis.252  However, 
it is relevant in the context of copyright because the owner’s 
interest relates to the economic exploitation of his work in the 
market.  In this way, the market impact consideration 
accommodates speech concerns by only disfavoring expression 
that is not compatible with the copyright owner’s economic rights. 
Similarly, fair use’s consideration of a work’s 
transformativeness recognizes the potential speech interests of the 
defendant.  By focusing on the ways in which the infringing work 
is different from the original, fair use pays attention to whether the 
defendant exercised his right to free speech.  This is not to say that 
a speaker must say something new or original in order to gain the 
First Amendment’s protections.  Rather, the transformative nature 
 
 250 See id. at 22. 
 251 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2007).  Section 107 provides that fair use is evaluated according 
to “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.” Id.  The Canadian Copyright Act considers similar 
criteria under its fair dealing exception. Canada Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 29 
(1985) (excepting research or private study, criticism or review, news reporting, acts 
undertaken without motive or gain, and educational instruction or examination). 
 252 See McGowan, supra note 42, at 334–35. 
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of the defendant’s work helps indicate whether he was merely 
appropriating the owner’s property or whether he had genuine 
speech interests.  When a speaker uses another person’s property 
for expressive purposes, he does not simply use the property 
without doing anything more.  A person who enters another 
person’s property does not exercise any obvious speech interest 
unless he also does something else, like wave a placard or shout a 
political slogan.  The need for the speaker to do something more 
than just use the property is necessary in order to discern an 
expressive purpose.  In the case of copyrighted property, it is not 
satisfactory for a speaker to simply reproduce the work.  The 
speaker must contribute expression of his own in order to 
demonstrate a speech-related purpose.  In this way, the 
transformative factor of the fair use defense helps to determine 
whether there is a genuine speech interest in play.  Therefore, as a 
general matter, the fair use doctrine helps to attain an appropriate 
balance between the copyright owner’s property interest and the 
defendant’s speech interest.  Through the four statutory factors, 
fair use extends protection to works that represent genuine 
expressive interests and are compatible with the owner’s property 
rights. 
This analysis makes it clear that Michelin was wrongly 
decided.253  In that case, the union’s use of the Michelin Tire Man 
did not impair the copyright owner’s property rights.  For one 
thing, the union did not use the copyrighted work for economic 
purposes.  It used the Michelin Tire Man in order to recruit 
employees to its organization, not to profit directly from its use of 
the copyrighted work.  Although the union may have had a 
financial incentive to recruit new members, it did not thwart the 
copyright owner’s right to exploit its work.  The Michelin 
corporation is still able to use its logo to advertise its products and 
to represent its company image.  Therefore, the union’s use was 
compatible with the function of the copyrighted work.  In addition, 
the union used the Michelin Tire Man in a parodic way.  The 
leaflets used the company logo in order to ridicule the logo itself.  
Unless there is a blanket prohibition on parodies, it is necessary to 
 
 253 See supra notes 79–85 and accompanying text. 
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borrow from an existing work in order to parody it.  However, the 
use of copyrighted logos can be problematic because they are 
usually short, indivisible works from which a parodist is likely to 
copy the entire work in order to parody it.  Parody’s implications 
for copyrighted logos are beyond the scope of this Article, but the 
union’s parodic purposes do raise significant free speech concerns 
in this case.  Further, it is evident that the union exercised its right 
to free speech.  By altering the Michelin Tire Man to convey an 
entirely different message, the union copied the work in a 
transformative way.  Unlike a wholesale copier, the union 
exhibited significant expression of its own to raise genuine speech 
concerns.  Therefore, the court was mistaken to brush aside the 
constitutional challenges and should have considered whether the 
copyright owner’s property rights justified the infringement on the 
union’s speech rights. 
Lastly, the Michelin case illustrates another way in which 
copyright ought to accommodate the speech interests of others.  
The Canadian jurisprudence recognizes that there is a particularly 
powerful claim to use a forum for speech purposes where there is a 
connection to one of the underlying values of free speech.  Justice 
McLachlin’s opinion in Committee for the Commonwealth254 
focused on the link between the use of the forum and the three 
main goals of freedom of expression.  If the defendant’s speech in 
a particular place is related to political or democratic participation, 
the attainment of truth, or individual autonomy, the forum may 
need to accommodate that speech.  In Michelin, the union’s 
activity served several speech-related values—it expressed the 
union’s position against the Michelin corporation and it facilitated 
the ability of employees to associate with the union.  In other 
words, the union’s use of the copyrighted logo was tied to 
important political and democratic values in being able to express 
criticism and solidarity within a labor union.  In particular, 
Michelin’s context of union activity provides a particularly 
compelling reason to view the speech interests in terms of its far-
reaching implications on democratic and social values. 
 
 254 Comm. for the Commonwealth v. Can., [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 (Can.). 
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CONCLUSION 
The conflict between copyright and free speech needs a new 
approach.  The existing debate is mired in a contradictory 
argument about whether copyright enhances or restricts speech.  
Meanwhile, the courts seem to assume that copyright is property 
and copyright is therefore largely immunized from speech 
concerns.  Both of these premises are false; copyright is about 
property rights, not speech regulation.  Yet, even as property, 
copyright is subject to the First Amendment.  Since copyright is 
not private property, but quasi-public property that facilitates the 
availability of works to the public, copyright needs to 
accommodate the speech interests of others.  There is a conflict 
between the copyright and speech, but the conflict needs to be 
analyzed in terms of the copyright owner’s property interest versus 
the other party’s speech interest.  It is only by viewing the conflict 
in terms of copyright’s status as property that the values behind 
copyright and speech can be fully understood and respected. 
